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The Supreme Court Enters the "Jar
Wars": Drug Testing, Public Employees,
and the Fourth Amendment
Kenneth C. Haas*
I. Introduction
Drug abuse in the United States has grown to be a matter of
great national concern. A recent Gallup poll revealed that the American people now view drug abuse as the most serious problem facing
the nation, replacing the "guns and butter" issues of international
conflict and economic distress.' Today, drug users are found at all
levels of society and in virtually all occupations. Indeed, the use of
illegal drugs by employees appears to be a growing problem in the
workplace. 2 Employees who use drugs have three to four times as
many accidents as other employees, and many of these accidents result in death, injuries, or substantial property loss. 3 Drug abusers
cost employers billions of dollars annually in lost productivity, medical expenses, and property losses. These costs are attributable to

such factors as damage to equipment, poor job performance, higher
insurance costs, increased claims made on company health plans,
high absenteeism among drug users, and employee theft. 4 Studies estimate that the cost to the economy may exceed sixty billion dollars
a year.'
* Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Sociology, and Political Science, University of
Delaware. Ph.D. (Political Science) 1978, Rutgers University.
I. Drugs are No. I Woe, Poll Finds, Miami Herald, Aug. 15, 1989, at I A, col. 5. In the
poll, conducted in June and July of 1989, 27 percent of the adult respondents selected drug
abuse as the most important problem confronting the country. Eight percent placed "poverty,
homelessness, and hunger" at the forefront; seven percent, the economy in general; six percent,
the federal budget deficit; another six percent, the environment; four percent, the fear of war;
and three percent, crime generally, Id. at 20A, col. 1.
2. It has been estimated that 10 to 23% of all employees use drugs at work. See Note,
Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L. REV. 832, 832
(1987).
3. See Sunderland & Rathbone, Jar Wars: Drug Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 529, 535 (1987). On January 4, 1987, 16 people were killed near Baltimore
in a collision between a Conrail freight train and an Amtrak passenger train. Both the engineer and a crewman on the Conrail train tested positive for marijuana in post-accident urine
tests. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at B2, col. 4.
4. Note, Employee Drug Testing-Balancingthe Interests in the Workplace: A Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 74 VA. L. REV. 969, 970-71 (1988).
5. Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 53 (estimate as of
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Faced with this problem, both private and public employers
have taken steps to deal directly with employee drug taking. Private
employers are using a variety of methods, including private investigators, monitoring cameras, dogs trained to detect drugs, and blood
and urine tests.' Government employers have generally taken a more
restricted approach, relying heavily on urine testing. The Reagan administration called for the urinalysis of approximately 1.1 million
federal employees in "sensitive" jobs, from soldiers to railroad workers to Justice Department attorneys, and the Bush administration is
continuing to pursue that goal. State and local governments have
taken the cue and have also instituted employee urinalysis programs
ranging from pre-employment testing of job applicants to unannounced, random testing of long-time employees."
Understandably, such programs have given rise to a storm of
protest and the filing of numerous lawsuits in federal and state
courts.9 It is important to note, however, that the United States Constitution protects only public employees from alleged violations of
rights by their employers. Private employers are not bound by the
Bill of Rights or other provisions of the Constitution, all of which
explicitly limit only the actions of government entities and government employers. 10 Thus it is not surprising that the large majority of
1983).
6. Approximately 50% of the Fortune 500 companies have implemented some form of
drug testing. Most of these programs involve only pre-employment urine testing of job applicants. See Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 703 (1987); Sanders, A Boost for
Drug Testing, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 62.
7. See Tolchin, The Government Still Waits to Test Millions for Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 26, 1989, at E5, col. 1; Isikoff & Havemann, Bennett Now Urging Federal Drug Testing,
Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 7, 1989, at 3A, col. 2.
8. Of course, the controversy over drug testing also extends to efforts to test college,
professional and amateur athletes, prisoners, pre-trial detainees, probationers, parolees, and
others who are not employees. However, the vast majority of lawsuits and court decisions have
involved employee challenges of employer drug-testing programs. See generally Siegel, State
and Federal Courts Struggle with the Constitutionality of Drug Testing, Civ. LIB., No. 363,
at 6-7 (1988); Brock & McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REv. 505 (1988);
Cochran, Drug Testing of Athletes and the United States Constitution: Crisis and Conflict, 92
DICK. L. REV. 571 (1988); Cohen & King, Drug Testing and Corrections, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
151 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Cox, Juries Sympathetic in Drug-Test Cases, 10 NAT'L L.J. 3 (1987);
Orthmann, Federally Mandated Drug Testing: An Update, 3 EMPL. TESTING 409 (1989).
10. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that the fourth
amendment does not apply to actions by private individuals). See also Monroe v. Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (applying Jacobsen to dismiss a
private-employee drug-testing suit). Although the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and most
state constitutions do not restrict private employers from infringing privacy rights, privatesector employees may have legal redress under some circumstances. For example, private employees who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement may be able to challenge a
company's drug testing as a violation of that agreement. In employee situations lacking a

JAR WARS

the drug-testing suits filed in American courts have attacked testing
conducted by government agencies and government-regulated industries such as railroads and the nuclear power industry.11 Most of
these cases have challenged compulsory urine-testing programs
under the theory that such testing violates the fourth amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
This Article examines the current law of government-employee
drug testing, with special reference to the evolving law of urine testing. In its 1988-1989 term, the United States Supreme Court announced two major decisions on the constitutionality of public-employee drug-testing programs. In the first case, Skinner v. Railway
collective bargaining agreement, an employee may have a basis for a tort action claiming
wrongful discharge, defamation, invasion of privacy, or some other wrong in cases involving a
refusal to submit to urinalysis testing or a false testing result. See generally Comment, Employee Drug Testing-Balancing the Employer's Right to Know with the Employee's Right to
Privacy, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 27, 44-53. For a thorough discussion of the accuracy of various
drug-testing methods, see Sunderland & Rathbone, supra note 3, at 536-48 (false-positive
results may occur at levels as high or higher than 25 % if the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) is used alone, but confirmation testing using the Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) technique can reduce (but not eliminate) errors
significantly).
Several state constitutions contain right of privacy and/or search and seizure clauses that
arguably protect against extragovernmental invasions of privacy. For example, the California
Constitution's privacy clause has been held to afford protection against both governmental and
private violations of privacy. See, e.g., White v. Davis, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105-06, 533 P.2d
222, 223-34, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774-75 (1975). Finally, it must be stressed that this is a new and
rapidly changing area of law. Regardless of court decisions affecting public employees, legislative action may place limitations on private employers' drug-testing efforts. In recent years,
many states have passed legislation prohibiting or limiting certain uses of polygraphs, and a
number of state legislatures are currently devising drug-testing legislation modeled on polygraph-testing legislation. Moreover, other federal, state, and municipal laws may prove useful
in blocking the testing plans of private employers. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 could be used to challenge a drug-testing program as a pretext to discriminate
against minorities. See generally Note, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the
Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453 (1987); Comment, UnrestrictedPrivate Employee Drug Testing Programs: An Invasion of the Worker's Right to Privacy, 23
CAL. W.L. REV. 72 (1986); Rector, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: A
Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1986).
11. The line between government action and private action is often unclear. For example, whether or not a government subcontractor or other private employer falls under the state
action doctrine will usually depend upon a court's analysis of whether and to what extent the
government encourages or participates in the actions of the private employer; whether and to
what extent the government subsidizes the actions of the private employer; whether and to
what extent the government regulates the private employer; whether the private entity is performing a function that is ordinarily the exclusive prerogative of the government; and whether
a symbiotic relationship exists between the government and the private entity. See generally
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
839-43 (1982). On March 21, 1989, the Supreme Court held that breath, blood, and urine
tests required by private railroads in reliance upon regulations promulgated by the Federal
Railroad Administration clearly implicate the fourth amendment because the regulations
demonstrate that the federal government has actively encouraged, endorsed, and participated
in the testing. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411-12
(1989).
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Labor Executives' Association,12 the Court assessed the validity of

Federal Railroad Adminstration regulations mandating breath,
blood, and urine testing of railroad employees after major train accidents. The second case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,1 3 focused on the constitutionality of a United States Customs
Service program requiring all employees seeking promotion or transfer to drug-enforcement jobs to undergo urinalysis. After a brief re-

view of the doctrinal developments in fourth amendment law that led
to these decisions, the Article examines both decisions, with an emphasis on the competing theories of fourth amendment jurisprudence

articulated by the majority and dissenting Justices in the Von Raab
case. The Article demonstrates that the Railway Labor Executives'
and Von Raab decisions established a general analytical framework
for evaluating the constitutionality of government-employee drug

testing, but that it remains difficult to distinguish permissible drugtesting programs from impermissible ones. The Article concludes
with an analysis of several of the most important questions still unresolved at the end of the 1988-89 judicial term.
II.

The Constitutional Framework

A.

Constitutional Challenges to Public-Employee Drug Testing

Public employees have challenged drug testing under a variety
of constitutional theories; most of these theories, however, have not
survived judicial scrutiny. For example, plaintiffs tried unsuccessfully to overturn employer drug-testing schemes on the basis of the
first amendment's freedom of religion clause,1 ' the fifth amendment

protection against self-incrimination,' 15 the ninth amendment's implicit guarantee of privacy,"6 and the fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection" and substantive due process.1 8 In a few
12. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
13. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
14. See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1516-23 (D. Neb.
1987), affd, 844 F.2d 562, 563-66 (8th Cir. 1988).
15. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th
Cir. 1987), affid on other grounds, 109 S' Ct. 1384 (1989). All such efforts are probably
doomed to failure. Since Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966), it has been wellsettled that the protection against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial evidence, not to
bodily fluids or other physical specimens. Moreover, the protection against self-incrimination
applies only in criminal cases and thus cannot be used to challenge urine tests that are used
strictly for civil purposes. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Authority, 680 F. Supp.
590, 611-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
16. See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1528 (D. Neb.
1987).
17. See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1147-48 (3d Cir.
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cases, employees successfully asserted that they were denied their

procedural due process rights under the fifth or fourteenth amendments because they were fired solely on the basis of a positive urinal-

ysis and thus were deprived of a property interest in their job and/or
a liberty interest in their good reputation without a fair hearing. 9
But to prevail on the basis of such a procedural due process claim,

the plaintiff must show that the drug-testing program is procedurally
flawed in some way. This probably will become increasingly difficult.

Most courts will require only that an employee who tests positive be
given the right to take confirmation tests and/or the opportunity to
explain a positive test result, and employers should find it easy to

satisfy these requirements."
A few plaintiffs unsuccessfully contended that drug testing vio-

lates a general constitutional right of privacy.2 In the celebrated
case of Griswold v. Connecticut,"2 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut law that made it a crime for any person, married or single, to use any contraceptive. The Griswold Court, through

a majority opinion authored by Justice William Douglas, acknowledged that the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of
privacy.1 The majority Justices reasoned, however, that a right to

privacy was implicit in the Constitution as a result of "zones of privacy" created by the "liberty" safeguards in the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and by the "penumbras"

surrounding the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.2 ,
Although Griswold remains settled law, the general constitutional right to privacy has not played a major role in drug-testing
litigation and is not likely to do so in the future. Certainly a plaintiff
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1636 (1989); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th
Cir. 1987).
18. See, e.g., Everett, 833 F.2d at 1512-13.
19. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1520-22 (D. N.J. 1986);
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1502-07 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 833
F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
20. See Note, supra note 4, at 981-82.
21. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 591-92 (1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1144
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Id. at 482-83.
24. Id. at 484-86. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Brennan, argued that the decision could have rested solely on the ninth
amendment's declaration that "[tihe enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). Justice Goldberg asserted that the ninth amendment expressly recognizes the existence of fundamental personal rights such as privacy that are protected from government
abridgement. See id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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can argue that the entire process of obtaining and testing a urine
sample violates basic privacy rights, especially when the testing
reveals evidence of off-the-job substance use that may have no effect
on a worker's job performance. The Supreme Court, however, has
construed the constitutional right of privacy to apply only in cases
involving marriage, procreation, abortion, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. 5 Thus in Roe v. Wade,26
the Court declared that the Griswold-created right to privacy forbade the states to make it a crime for a woman to have an abortion
during the first two trimesters of her pregnancy. On the other hand,
the Court recently held that this same right to privacy could not be
used to invalidate state laws making it a crime for consenting adults
to engage in homosexual sodomy in the privacy of their own homes.2 7
Since the consumption of illicit drugs and governmental efforts to
detect the use of such drugs do not invade the privacy recognized in
marriage, procreation, and family relationships, courts are not likely
to strike down drug-testing programs on "pure privacy" grounds.
But perhaps a more important reason that the general constitutional right to privacy will remain on the fringes of drug-testing litigation is that those who challenge drug-testing schemes also have a
fourth amendment claim that rests on much stronger doctrinal
grounds and that subsumes any Griswold-type claims. Accordingly,
the great majority of courts have addressed privacy issues in drugtesting cases only in the context of the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.28 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that government-employee urinalysis is a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.2 9 Thus the future of
public-employee drug testing will be largely shaped by judically-created guidelines distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable
drug-testing programs on the basis of fourth amendment standards
25. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977). Carey refers to
both pre- and post-Griswold cases as having recognized a right of privacy only in certain
limited areas. Id. at 684 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing and education)).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986). See generally Note, The Right
to Privacy: A Man's Home is no Longer his Castle, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 833 (1986-87).
28. See generally Note, Constitutional Law: Urinalysis and the Public Employer-Another Well-Delineated Exception to the Warrant Requirement?, 39 OKLA. L. REV.
257 (1986); Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
201 (1986).
29. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying test.
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and guidelines.
B.

The Fourth Amendment

To understand why the fourth amendment has emerged as the
most potent constitutional weapon against various public-employee
drug-testing programs, it is important to look to the precise wording
of the amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."0

Studies of constitutional history show that this amendment was primarily a response to the writs of assistance and the general warrants
that English authorities used in the colonies to prevent smuggling
and collect tariffs and customs duties.3 " These general writs and warrants authorized customs officers to break into any house, day or
night, search any place or possession therein, and seize any property,
parcels, or papers. 2 The use of general writs and warrants was
widely denounced in the colonies and, in fact, provoked riots in Massachusetts in 1765 and 1768." 3
There is no doubt that "[t] he Bill of Rights in general and the
Fourth Amendment, in particular [are] profoundly anti-government
' Nevertheless, the fourth amendment attracted very
documents." 34
little judicial attention through most of the nineteenth century. The
first major Supreme Court decision to prohibit government use of
potentially incriminating evidence on fourth amendment grounds
was Boyd v. United States 3 in 1886. In determining that a defendant's refusal to turn over his private books and papers to a United
30.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

31.

See generally K.

HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY

53-58

(1989); R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 20-21, 34 (1955); S.
SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 38-45 (1988); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-35 (1969).

32.
33.

S. SALTZBURG, supra note 31, at 42.
Id, at 42-43. See also R. RUTLAND, supra note 31, at 34 (noting that "A List of

Infringements and Violations of Rights" presented at a Boston town meeting in 1772 included
the following complaint against writs of assistance: "[Olur houses and even our bed chambers
are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered
by wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants.").
34. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353
(1974).

35.

116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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States Attorney could not be construed as a confession to any
crimes, the Court reasoned that the compulsory production of such
private papers would violate both the fourth amendment and the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment."6 In no uncertain
terms, the Boyd Court declared that the fourth amendment bars
"any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's . . . private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of [a] crime .

.

. .

In

1921, Gouled v. United States 8 expanded Boyd to exclude the use
of any illegally obtained evidence, not just private papers. Since
then, the Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that the essential
purposes of the fourth amendment are to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials" 39
and to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials." '4 0
C. Changing Fourth Amendment Standards: The Emergence of
the "Special Needs" Exception
To determine whether certain public-employee drug-testing programs constitute "arbitrary invasions" of "the privacy and security
of individuals," one must return to the wording of the fourth amendment and note that it divides naturally into two separate but interrelated clauses. The first clause refers to the right of the people to be
protected from unreasonable searches; the second clause specifies the
conditions under which search warrants can be issued.41 The relationship between the two clauses remains unclear, "2 but the Supreme
Court has expressed a strong preference for searches and seizures
conducted pursuant to search warrants. In the seminal 1967 case of
Katz v. United States,"a the Court, stressing the importance of protecting the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, articulated
the now familiar principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se
36. Id. at 629-30.
37. Id. at 630.
38. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
39. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
40. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42. For example, one interpretation is that the reasonable search is one conducted pursuant to the warrant requirement of the second clause. A second theory is that the first clause
implies that some searches may be unreasonable even when conducted pursuant to a warrant.
A third interpretation is that the first clause permits some searches to be adjudged reasonable
without a warrant. Although all three interpretations can find support in case law, the third
theory is predominant today. See Note, supra note 28, at 258.
43. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 44 In 1978,
the Court deemed this "a cardinal principle"4 5 of search and seizure

law, and has continued to require that a warrant be obtained unless
the search fits into an established exception or is deemed not to have
invaded one's reasonable expectation of privacy."'
At first glance, it would appear that urine tests mandated by
public employers would be unreasonable unless conducted pursuant

to a warrant. However, in the past few years, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated an increasing willingness to waive both the warrant re44. Id. at 357. It is interesting to note that the "few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement include the exigent circumstances excepion, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); the search incident to arrest exception,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); the "stop and frisk" exception, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); the
automobile exception, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); the hot pursuit exception, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); the plain view exception, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); the "open fields" exception, Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57 (1924); the abandoned property exception, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960); the misplaced trust exception, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); the inventory search exception, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); the border search
exception, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); the administrative search
exception, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); the school search exception,
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); and the private citizen exception, United States v.
Seidelitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979). See generally
Alpert & Haas, Judicial Rulemaking and the Fourth Amendment: Cars, Containers,and Exclusionary Justice, 35 ALA. L. REv. 23 (1984-85).
45. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
46. Since 1986, the Supreme Court has evidenced a growing willingness to permit warrantless police surveillances and inspections on the theory that the challenged police practices
do not violate an expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). For example, in
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Court held that police do not need to obtain a
search warrant before conducting surveillance of the fenced backyard of a particular house
from a fixed-wing plane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The majority concluded that the
respondent's expectation that his fenced yard was protected from such a warrantless, aerial
inspection was unreasonable because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace could
have seen everything that these officers observed." Id. at 213-14.
Two years laier, in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the Court approved the
warrantless search and seizure of plastic garbage bags left for collection outside the curtilage
of a house. Justice White, writing for a six-to-two majority, reasoned that since it is common
knowledge that such bags are "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and
other members of the public," the respondents did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the bags. Id. at 40-41.
In Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989), a sharply divided court (five-to-four) held that
police need not obtain a warrant to conduct surveillance of the interior of a partially covered
greenhouse in a residential backyard from a helicopter circling over the greenhouse at the
height of 400 feet. Justice White's plurality opinion stressed that Federal Aviation Administration rules allow helicopters to fly below the 500 feet limit imposed on fixed-wing planes and
that the respondent therefore should have realized that "[any member of the public could
legally have been flying over [his] property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could
have observed [his] greenhouse." Id. at 697. It is interesting to note that in each of these cases,
as in many of the recent cases upholding questionable police search practices, the police were
acting on suspicion that the respondents were engaged in growing and/or selling illegal drugs.
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quirement and the traditional understanding that even a search that
may be permissibly conducted without a warrant must be based
upon probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.4 7
This has been accomplished through the use of a "reasonableness"
test. Whereas the probable cause standard places the individual's
right to be left alone above the government's interest in conducting a
search,4 8 the reasonableness test weighs both interests equally and

balances them against each other in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding each case. 9
It is especially significant that the Supreme Court has embraced
the reasonableness test as the appropriate fourth amendment standard in cases that do not involve ordinary street crime. For example,
in 1985 the Court held that public school officials need neither a
search warrant nor circumstances constituting probable cause before
searching a student5 0 In cases involving the "special needs" of a

school environment, all that is necessary, according to the standard
articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 5 1 is: (1) that school officials
47. For an excellent discussion of this trend, see Bookspan, Behind Closed Doors: Constitutional Implications of Government Employee Drug Testing, II NOVA L. REV. 307, 32937 (1987).
48. The Supreme Court has found probable cause to search to exist when the facts and
circumstances in a given situation are sufficient to convince a person of reasonable caution to
believe that seizable items are located at the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Similarly, the Court recently held that probable cause means "a
fair probability" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Justices repeatedly have stressed that probable cause must be a
flexibly defined concept. Thus, probable cause often is defined as a degree of certainty lying
somewhere between "reasonable suspicion," the amount of certainty necessary to justify a police officer's "stop and frisk," and "beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard of proof in a
criminal trial. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 146-47
(2d ed. 1986).
49. The reasonableness test derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), that a police officer can stop, detain, and conduct a limited, "pat-down"
search of a person upon less than probable cause if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that the person has been or is about to be involved in committing a crime. Since Terry, the Court has emphasized that the concept of reasonable suspicion,
like the concept of probable cause, is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Thus the existence of reasonable
suspicion must be evaluated in terms of the totality of circumstances in each case. United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). Such factors include the intrusiveness of the
search or seizure and the strength of the government's justifications for the search or seizure.
Id. The Court recently defined reasonable suspicion as something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch but something less than probable cause. United States v. Sokolow,
109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). The Justices' failure to define reasonable suspicion with greater
precision has led to unresolved questions concerning the differences that may or may not exist
between "reasonable suspicion," "individualized suspicion," and "particularized suspicion."
Moreover, the Court has not yet decided whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness test. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987).
50. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
51. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The T.L.O. decision is analyzed in terms of its impact on
school drug-testing programs in Note, School Drug Tests: A Fourth Amendment Perspective,
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have reasonable grounds to suspect that a search will turn up evidence of violations of law or school rules (i.e., that the search is "justified at its inception"); and (2) that the search be reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the search in the first
place.5 2 A similar justification for foregoing the warrant and probable cause requirements in favor of a two-pronged reasonableness test
was offered in Griffin v. Wisconsin. In upholding state laws that
permit probation officers to conduct warrantless searches of probationers' homes, the Court noted that exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirements can be permitted in situations in which
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractical.""
This special needs argument also played a prominent role in
O'Connor v. Ortega,5 5 a 1987 decision that authorized government
employers to conduct searches of employees' offices (including desks
and file cabinets) without a search warrant and without probable
cause. Writing for a four-Justice plurality,5 6 Justice O'Connor affirmed that, in many instances, public employees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their desks and offices, 57 and that government employers are subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment when they conduct searches and seizures that infringe the reasonable privacy expectations of employees. 8 Each case, therefore,
requires balancing "the invasion of the employee's legitimate expectations of privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.159 The plurality
contended that requiring an employer to obtain a search warrant to
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 275.
52. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). Applying this two-part test, the Court sustained a vice-principal's search of
a 14-year-old girl's purse merely because she was caught smoking a tobacco cigarette in a
lavatory. Id. at 328-29. He discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and turned the girl
over to the police. Id.
53. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
54. Id. at 872 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
55. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
56. Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion stating several disagreements with the
plurality's analysis but agreeing that employment-related searches are among the searches that
fall in the "special needs beyond the normal needs of law enforcement" category and thus can
be conducted without a search warrant and without probable cause. See id. at 729-32.
57. Id. at 717-18. However, the plurality noted that routine entrances by supervisors and
other employees reduce these privacy expectations and that "some governmental offices may be
so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable." Id. at
718.
58. Id. at 714.
59. Id. at 719-20.
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search an employee's office for work-related reasons (including the
asserted need to identify and safeguard government records in connection with a pending investigation into suspected employee misconduct) would "disrupt the routine conduct of business and unduly
burden agency supervisors."6 Moreover, added the plurality, "[it] is
simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies
to learn the subtleties of the probable-cause standard."'"
Workplace searches by government supervisors, in other words,
are similar to school searches conducted by school officials in that
they must be analyzed in terms of "special needs" that go beyond
ordinary law enforcement needs.6 2 To replace the warrant and probable cause requirements, the plurality created a special reasonableness test to be used on a case-by-case basis to judge the constitutionality of workplace searches: "the standard of reasonableness under
all the circumstances." 6 Under this two-part test, a warrantless
workplace search is justified at its inception "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such
' Once begun,
as to retrieve a needed file." 64
the search is permissible
in scope if it is limited to the objectives of the search and is "not
excessively intrusive" given the nature of the misconduct.65
The Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v. Ortega certainly
did not resolve any of the legal issues surrounding drug testing. But
the Court's adoption of still another special needs exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements led Professor Phyllis T.
Bookspan, a leading authority on drug-testing law, to speculate that
"it would not be wholly surprising to see a 'drug-testing' exception
emerge"6 6 when the Court addresses the constitutionality of various
drug-testing schemes. Following is an examination of how the Supreme Court decided two major 1989 cases in which public-em60. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987).
61. Id. at 724-25.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 725-26.
64. Id. at 726.
65. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987). In a sharp dissent, Justice Blackmun
chastised the plurality for sacrificing the warrant and probable cause requirements for a standard that "makes reasonable almost any workplace search by a public employer." See id. at
734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For an excellent critique of Ortega, see Note, Fourth Amendment-Work-Related Searches by Government Employers Valid on "Reasonable" Grounds,
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 792 (1988).
66. Bookspan, Jar Wars: Employee Drug Testing, the Constitution, and the American
Drug Problem, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 375 (1988).
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ployee unions challenged the constitutionality of drug testing on
fourth amendment grounds.
III.
A.

The Supreme Court and Public-Employee Drug Testing
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
1. Is Drug Testing a Search?-The first step in traditional

fourth amendment analysis is to determine whether or not a challenged governmental activity amounts to a search covered by the

fourth amendment. On March 21, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced its first two decisions on the constitutionality of particular
governmental drug-testing programs 6 7 and, to no one's surprise, the
Court held that public-employee urinalysis is indeed a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 8 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,6 9 the Court, speaking through Justice

Kennedy's majority opinion, pointed out that compelled blood testing
had already been recognized by the Court as a search since it implicates legitimate societal concerns about bodily integrity.70 Blood test-

ing involves a physical penetration of the skin and an ensuing chemical analysis of the blood sample, both of which infringe
"expectation(s) of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
67. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
68. Although it was widely expected that the Supreme Court would agree with the
unanimous judgment of the federal appeals courts that urinalysis amounts to a search, the
Court has sometimes surprised legal scholars by declaring that arguably intrusive police actions did not constitute searches. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (police
observation of the contents of a partially covered greenhouse on residential curtilage from
helicopter circling at an altitude of 400 feet did not infringe a societally-recognized expectation of privacy and thus did not amount to a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986) (police inspection of the fenced backyard of a particular house from a fixed-wing airplane flying at 1,000 feet did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy and thus did
not constitute a search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (the warrantless installation of an electronic "beeper" in a container without the owner's consent and the transfer of
the container to the defendants for purposes of tracking their movements did not amount to a
search); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (the field testing of a suspicious white
powder cannot be considered a search since the test could reveal only whether the substance
was cocaine); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (a "sniff test" by a narcotics detection dog is not a search); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (the placement of a
locational beeper inside a chloroform container that had been sold to a suspected drug dealer
and the use of the beeper to help the police conduct visual surveillance of the suspect's move'ments did not constitute a search).
69. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
70. Id. at 1412. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (blood testing is a fourth amendment search). Additionally, the Court has recognized the surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect's body for evidence as a fourth amendment search. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (proposed surgery, under general anesthetic, to remove bullet
from suspect's chest would violate the fourth amendment).
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reasonable. 71 Similarly, compelling a person to produce aveolar or
"deep lung" breath and the subsequent analysis of the breath are
intrusions that trigger understandable concerns about personal
72
privacy.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that urine-testing procedures,
unlike blood-testing procedures, do not include a physical penetration of the skin.7 3 He asserted, however, that it was indisputable that
the chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, "can reveal a host
of private medical facts about an employee, including whether she is
epilectic, pregnant, or diabetic.

'7 4

Moreover, urine testing proce-

dures typically involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination-a highly personal and private function that, as a matter of law
and social custom, is "traditionally performed without public observation. ' ' 75 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy announced that the Justices
were in agreement with every federal appeals court that had considered the question: urine testing intrudes upon expectations of privacy
long recognized by our society as reasonable70 and thus must be
deemed a search under the fourth amendment.
2. Can Public Employees in Safety-Sensitive Jobs be Subjected to Post-Accident Drug Testing?-After making it clear that
urine testing, like blood testing and breathalyzer testing, constitutes
a fourth amendment search, Justice Kennedy addressed the major
issue presented in the Railway Labor Executives case-the constitutionality of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations
mandating urine, blood, and breath tests of employees after serious
train accidents, fatal incidents, or rule violations. The regulations in
question require the prompt collection of blood and urine samples
.from all crew members of trains involved in accidents that include a
fatality, the release of hazardous material accompanied by either
evacuation or injury, or damage to railroad property of $500,000 or
more. The regulations also mandate blood and urine testing after
any train incident that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad
employee, and after any impact accident, which is defined as any
71. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412 (1989).
72. Id. at 1412-13.
73. Id. at 1413.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)).
76. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989). Justice
Kennedy noted that it was not necessary to the majority's analysis to determine whether the
taking of blood or urine samples amounts to a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 1413 n.4.
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collision that results in a reportable injury or in damage to railroad
property of $50,000 or more. Finally, the regulations provide for
breath or urine tests when a supervisor has reasonable suspicion that
an employee's acts or omissions contributed to an accident, when two
supervisors agree that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that an
employee is under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, or when
the employee violates regulations against speeding or other railroad
operating rules.77
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, concluding that individualized suspicion is an essential element of a constitutionally permissible drug-testing program,
held that the FRA regulations pertaining to post-accident testing
were violative of the fourth amendment.7 8 By a seven-to-two vote,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the regulations served
compelling governmental interests and were thus constitutionally
valid even though the regulations contained no warrant requirement
and permitted testing under circumstances in which there would
sometimes be neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that a particular employee was under the influence of drugs.79
Justice Kennedy began by announcing that his majority opinion
would analyze the constitutional validity of the challenged regulations by employing a balancing test 80 similar to the reasonableness
analysis used in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 81 Griffin v. Wisconsin,8 2 and
O'Connor v. Ortega.3 Railway Labor Executives was not a criminal
case, requiring adherence to the procedures described in the fourth
amendment's warrant clause, but a case posing "special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 4 The proper mode of
inquiry, therefore, was "[a balancing of] the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probablecause requirements in the particular context.""s
77. See id. at 1407-10 for Justice Kennedy's overview of the FRA's drug-testing
regulations.
78. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd
sub. nor. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). Ironically, one
of the earliest drug-testing decisions announced by a federal court upheld the constitutionality
of rules requiring public bus drivers to submit to blood and urine tests if they were involved in
a serious accident. See Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538
F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
79. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1421-22 (1989).
80. Id. at 1413-14.
81. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
82. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
83. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
84. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
85. Id. Although Justice Kennedy pointed out that the railroads are closely regulated by
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Justice Kennedy briefly paid homage to the warrant requirement's role in protecting citizens against random and arbitrary governmental actions in ordinary law enforcement situations.8 6 He contended, however, that the FRA regulations were written in such a
narrow and specific way that a warrant requirement was not necessary to protect employees against abuse and arbitrariness imposed by
supervisors." For the most part, only employees involved in certain
accidents or incidents could be tested. 88 Some discretion would have
to be used in determining whether an employee's acts or omissions
contributed to an accident, but supervisors would have to use objective criteria to make these determinations, thus minimizing the likelihood of abuse of discretion.89
The majority opinion also stressed that since some drugs do not
remain in the urine or the bloodstream for long periods of time, the
delay necessary to obtain a search warrant could result in the loss of
valuable evidence as to whether these substances may have contributed to an accident. 9° Furthermore, requiring railroad supervisors,
who are not in the business of law enforcement, to become familiar
with the details of fourth amendment warrant procedures "is simply
unreasonable."9 1 Accordingly, the majority concluded that the absence of a warrant requirement did not undermine the constitutionality of the FRA regulations. 2
Justice Kennedy turned next to the question of whether postaccident testing could be conducted in the absence of probable cause
or at least some quantum of reasonable or individualized suspicion
that a particular employee was under the influence of alcohol or
some other drug. Conceding that "even a search that may be perthe government, id. at 1411-12, and stated that "[wie assess the FRA's scheme in light of its
obvious administrative purpose," id. at 1415 n.5, the majority opinion was not explicitly based
on the administrative search doctrine.
86. Id. at 1415.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1416 n.6.
89. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1416 n.6 (1989).
90. Id. at 1416 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 24,291 (1984)). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan in dissent, acknowledged that the importance of collecting blood and urine samples
before drug metabolites disappear may justify dispensing with the warrant requirement under
the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1426 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). However, the dissenters argued that the subsequent chemical testing of blood or
urine samples also constitutes a warrantless search that cannot be justified on "exigent circumstances" grounds: "Blood and urine do not spoil if properly collected and preserved, and there
is no reason to doubt the ability of railroad officials to grasp the relatively simple procedure of
obtaining a warrant authorizing, where appropriate, chemical analysis of the extracted fluids."
Id. at 1426.
91. Id. at 1416 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987)).
92. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1416 (1989).
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formed without a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on
probable cause [or at least individualized suspicion] to believe that
the person to be searched has violated the law," 9 Justice Kennedy
nevertheless reasoned that post-accident breath, blood, and urine
testing could be conducted in the absence of individualized suspicion.94 He allowed that the urine tests pose an especially difficult
question because of their greater intrusiveness. 5 However, it was important to note, he countered, that the regulations governing postaccident testing do not require that urine samples be furnished under
the direct observation of a monitor.96 It was also significant that railroad employees in safety-sensitive positions have diminished expectations of privacy as a result of "participation in an industry that is
regulated pervasively to ensure safety . . . . 97 Accordingly, the majority Justices were in agreement that the post-accident testing procedures "pose only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of
privacy of covered employees." 98
On the other hand, according to Justice Kennedy, the government has several compelling interests in carrying out post-accident
testing without having to prove the existence of individualized suspicion. 99 Of overarching importance is the protection of public safety;
railroad employees must "discharge duties fraught with such risks of
injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have
disastrous consequences." '10 Those covered by the FRA regulations
could potentially "cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others."' 1 1 The postaccident testing procedures, the Court stressed, are intended to provide valuable information that can help to pinpoint the causes of an
accident, 0 2 and to deter drug use "[b]y ensuring that employees
. . .know they will be tested upon the occurrence of a triggering
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.

Id. at 1416-17.
Id. at 1417-19.
Id. at 1418.
Id.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989).
Id. at 1419.
Id.

Id.
Id.

102. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1420 (1989). Justice
Kennedy expressed strong agreement with the proposition that by learning the causes of train
accidents-including the relative importance of such factors as drug impairment, poor training, and equipment failure-investigators can suggest measures that will help prevent future
accidents. In support, the Court cited Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978), "noting
that prompt investigation of the cause of a fire may uncover continuing danger and thereby
prevent [another] fire's occurrence." Railway Labor Executives, 109 S. Ct. at 1420.
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event, the timing of which no employee can predict with certainty
"103

Justice Kennedy argued that requiring supervisors to establish
the existence of individualized suspicion in the aftermath of an accident would defeat the government's compelling interests in public
safety, investigating the causes of accidents, and deterring drug use
among the covered employees.104 The scene at a serious railroad accident is typically confused and chaotic, and investigators often find
it very difficult to determine which crew members may have contributed to the accident.' 0 5 The delay caused by the need to identify
suspected crew members and gather sufficient evidence to support
the existence of individualized suspicion likely would result in the
"loss or deterioration of the evidence provided by the tests.""0 6 Consequently, the important governmental interests served by the postaccident testing regulations would be seriously hindered if railroad
supervisors were forced to gather specific facts amounting to an individualized suspicion of impairment before testing a particular employee.10 7 This led inexorably to the majority's conclusion:
In light of the limited discretion exercised by the railroad employers under the regulations, the surpassing safety interests
served by toxicological tests in this context, and the diminished
expectation of privacy that attaches to information pertaining to
the fitness of covered employees, we believe that it is reasonable
[within the meaning of the fourth amendment] to conduct such
tests in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that
any particular employee may be impaired.'0 8
It must be emphasized that in upholding the validity of the
FRA's post-accident drug-testing regulations, the majority used a
reasonableness test that was similar but not identical to the test employed in New Jersey v. T.L.O.' 0 9 and other cases that the Justices
view as posing "special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 11 0 Unlike the analyses performed in T.L.O., Griffin,"'
and Ortega,"' the reasonableness analysis of Railway Labor Execu103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Railway Labor Executives, at 1419-20.
Id. at 1420-21.
Id. at 1420.
Id.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1421 (1989).

108. Id. at 1422.
109.
110.
111.
112.

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Railway Labor Executives, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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tives did not follow a clear two-step process of first determining

whether the search was justified at its inception and then inquiring
whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the intrusion in the first place. 113 Instead, the
Court merely balanced the government's interests in drug testing
against the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy in light of
"all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the na-

ture of the search or seizure itself." '14 This can be called a "reasonableness under all the circumstances" or "multifactor balancing test,"
and can be criticized for lacking clarity and for being susceptible to
results-oriented manipulation by the Justices who constitute a majority in any given fourth amendment case. Without doubt, the use of
this kind of analysis in the Court's first drug-testing case constitutes

another significant retreat from strict adherence to the warrant and
probable cause requirements. 5
Justice Kennedy made it clear that the Court would not abandon its traditional warrant and probable cause analysis in routine
criminal cases."' However, he analogized the government's need to
regulate the railroads and other safety-sensitive industries to the government's interests in maintaining the efficient operation of schools
and government offices, and to the government's supervision of probationers and prisoners. 17 Since these kinds of governmental en113. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
114. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)). Justice Kennedy did
not explain why the majority Justices eschewed the explicitly two-pronged approach and used
instead a broad multifactor balancing test.
115. The trend toward dispensing with the warrant requirement is evident in the cases
cited in note 44 supra and also in recent decisions creating exceptions to the exclusionary rule
in criminal cases in which police conducted searches with tainted or insufficient search warrants. See Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988) (establishing "independent
source" exception to exclusionary rule by holding that evidence discovered by police during
initial warrantless entry into warehouse is admissible if same evidence is also discovered during
a second search pursuant to a search warrant that is based on information obtained wholly
independently of the initial illegal search); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule when police conduct a search and seize evidence in reasonable reliance upon a search warrant subsequently found to be unsupported by
probable cause).
Those who advocate expanding the exceptions to the warrant requirement and increasing
the use of a broad reasonableness inquiry often cite the case of United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950), in which the Court stated that "[tihe relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion
in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case." Id. at
66. Chief Justice Rehnquist has long favored expanded use of a Rabinowitz-type reasonableness test. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 305 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 516 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
117. Id.
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deavors present "special needs [that] make the warrant and probable-cause requirements impracticable,"" ' the appropriate standard
for reviewing the FRA regulations was held to be a broad type of
reasonableness test. 1" 9
Whereas a more traditional probable cause analysis would have
begun with the assumption that the railroad employees' interests in
privacy ranked at least slightly ahead of the government's interests,
the majority's reasonableness analysis began with the assumption
that the employees' privacy interests and the government's interests
were equally important. The Justices then proceeded to weigh the
probable benefits of implementing the FRA regulations against the
costs imposed on the personal privacy of employees. Since the Court
found the government's interests in promoting rail safety, deterring
drug abuse, and facilitating prompt accident investigations to outweigh railroad workers' privacy concerns, all of the FRA's drug testing regulations, including warrantless post-accident testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion, were upheld as constitutional.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall castigated the majority for utilizing "a formless and unguided
'reasonableness' balancing inquiry '
rather than the traditional analytic framework used in fourth amendment cases. 21 He rejected the
majority's "special needs" rationale as "unprincipled and dangerous,' ' 22 and pointed out that this was the first "special needs" case
to sanction searches that could not be supported by at least some
quantum of individualized evidence of culpability on the part of
those subjected to a search. 2 He added that even if he had accepted
the majority's view that the FRA's regulations should be analyzed
under a multifactor reasonableness test, he would have found the
regulations to be constitutionally invalid' 2 ' The majority, he contended, inflated the likely efficacy of the FRA's testing program and
erroneously declared the privacy and dignity interests of the employ118. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987), quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
119. Id. at 1413-15.
120. Id. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422-26 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Marshall accused the majority of "ignor[ing] the
text and doctrinal history of the Fourth Amendment, which require that highly intrusive
searches of this type be based on probable cause, not on the evanescent cost-benefit calculations of agencies or judges." Id. at 1423. The decision, the dissent declared, was the Court's
"longest step yet toward reading the probable-cause requirement out of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
122. Id. at 1426.
123. Id. at 1425.
124. Id. at 1430.
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ees to be minimal.12 5 Justice Marshall described the majority as having been "swept away by society's obsession with stopping the
scourge of illegal drugs" and concluded by predicting that ultimately, "today's decision will reduce the privacy all citizens may
''
enjoy. 112
B.

National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab

1. May Government Agencies Impose Mandatory Urine Tests
on Employees Seeking Promotion or Transfer to Drug-Enforcement
Jobs?
(a) The majority decision.-The second of the two Supreme

Court drug-testing decisions announced on March 21, 1989, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,127 focused on a

United States Customs Service drug-screening program requiring
urine tests of all incumbent employees seeking promotion or transfer
to positions involving direct interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring
the carrying of firearms. 2 1 Under the program, employees selected
125. See id. at 1427-32. Justice Marshall also faulted the majority for overlooking unnecessarily intrusive aspects of the FRA testing process. Id. at 1431-32. In particular, he questioned the need for both blood and urine tests if, as the testing regulations state, the FRA's
goal is to ascertain current impairment and not to identify employees who may use drugs while
off duty, but do so well in advance of reporting to work and thus pose no risk of on-duty
impairment. Id. at 1432. The more intrusive urine tests, he pointed out, are less efficacious
than blood tests because urine test do not measure current impairment and thus "cannot differentiate on-duty impairment from prior drug or alcohol use which has ceased to affect the
user's behavior." Id. at 1431. Therefore, the additional invasion triggered by testing urine as
well as blood "hardly ensures that privacy interests 'will be invaded no more than is necessary.'" Id. at 1432 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S, 325, 343 (1975)).
126. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1433 (1989). Although not joining in Justice Marshall's dissent, Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion
that noted his disagreement with the majority's deterrence rationale. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens agreed that the government's interest in determining the cause of train accidents justifies the FRA regulations, but
thought it "a dubious proposition" that the regulations would have a significant deterrent effect upon on-duty railroad employees. Id. Most people, he argued, do not go to work with the
expectation that they may be involved in a catastrophic accident. Id. "Moreover, even if they
are conscious of the possibilities that such an accident might occur and that alcohol or drug
use might be a contributing factor, if the risk of serious personal injury does not deter their use
of these substances, it seems highly unlikely that the additional threat of loss of employment
would have any effect on their behavior." Id. Justice Marshall's dissent made the same point:
"It is, of course, the fear of the accident, not the fear of a postaccident revelation, that deters."
Id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. 109 S. Ct. 1394 (1989).
128. The Customs Service program also requires urinalysis of first-time applicants seeking drug-enforcement jobs. The petitioners included, however, only incumbent employees.
Thus, the case presented only the issue of the constitutionality of the drug screening as it
applied to current employees seeking promotion or transfer to a covered position. See National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated, 109 S.
Ct. 1384 (1989).
It should also be noted that the Customs program requires urine tests of all prospective or
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conditionally for positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying
of firearms are notified by letter that their final selection is contin-

gent upon successful completion of a urine test. When the candidates
appear at the test site, they must remove any outer clothing, such as
a coat or jacket, surrender any personal belongings, and enter a

bathroom stall to urinate into a specimen jar. To protect against the
substitution of another person's urine or the adulteration of the
urine, a monitor of the same sex as the candidate stands next to the
stall "to listen for the normal sounds of urination." 129 After receiving
the specimen, the monitor inspects it for proper color and temperature, seals and marks the container, and sends it to the testing laboratory. The Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Test (EMIT) is used
to detect the presence of marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines,

or phencyclidine (PCP). If a sample tests positive, it will then be
retested with the more accurate Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) test. 30 Employees who test positive on both tests
and who offer no satisfactory explanation are subject to dismissal
from the Customs Service. Test results, however, cannot be turned
over to criminal prosecutors or to any other agency without the employee's written consent.'

A split Fifth Circuit panel, noting that the testing was not conducted on a random basis and did not include direct visual observation of the employees, held the program to be constitutional,3 2 and,

by a five-to-four margin, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals.' As he had in Railway Labor Executives, Justice Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion. Tellingly, he began by announcing that
current employees seeking a position involving the handling of classified information. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion stated that "[wle readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information ...." Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. at 1396.
However, the Supreme Court declined to assess the validity of the testing of the employees in
this category because the record was not clear as to whether the Customs Service had defined
the category of employees required to handle classified material in such a way as to include
only those employees likely to gain access to truly sensitive information. Therefore, the Court
remanded this question to the Fifth Circuit for clarification of the criteria used to determine
what materials are classified and which employees should be tested. Id. at 1397. The Court
instructed the Fifth Circuit panel to consider "pertinent information bearing upon the employees' privacy expectations, as well as the supervision to which these employees are already subject." Id.
129. Id. at 1388.
130. The pros and cons of EMIT, GC/MS, and other tests are discussed in Sunderland
& Rathbone, supra note 3, at 536-48.
131. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1387-89
(1989), for Justice Kennedy's summary of the testing regulations and the history of the
litigation.
132. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987),
vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
133. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
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the majority would examine the constitutionality of the Customs
Service urine-testing program by applying the same kind of "special
needs" reasonableness test used in the Railway Labor Executives
case.13 Like the FRA's post-accident testing regulations, the Customs program "is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement." 1I 5 Its purposes are not to bring criminal prosecutions
against employees, but to deter drug use among those seeking promotions to sensitive positions and to prevent drug users from attaining such positions.1 36 These are precisely the kinds of special needs,
according to Justice Kennedy, that may justify a departure from the
fourth amendment's ordinary warrant and probable cause
137
requirements.
Indeed, the majority needed only two paragraphs to dispose of
the warrant requirement. A warrant requirement in the context of
the Customs testing program, the Court argued, would do little to
protect personal privacy and would serve only to divert valuable resources from the agency's primary mission. 3 8 In ordinary criminal
prosecutions, a search warrant imposes a neutral magistrate between
the citizen and the police and serves to advise the citizen that a particular search of a particular person or place has been authorized by
law. 3 9 But, under the Customs program, every employee seeking a
covered position already is fully aware that he or she must take a
drug test. 4" Customs Service supervisors do not exercise any discretion whatsoever in deciding which employees must undergo urinalysis and thus "there are simply 'no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate'.' 41
Justice Kennedy next considered whether the Customs Service
testing program violated the traditional understanding that even a
warrantless search must be based upon probable cause or at least
some articulable facts constituting a basis for reasonable suspicion.
The majority answered this question in the negative, concluding that
the government's need to conduct the suspicionless searches required
by the Customs program outweighed the privacy interests of the cov134. Id. at 1390-91.
135. Id. at 1390.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1390-91.
138. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1391 (1989).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
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ered employees."" In the majority's view, the Customs Service made
a convincing argument that it had a compelling interest in ensuring
that employees engaged in drug enforcement efforts and employees
carrying firearms "are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.' 14 Front-line interdiction personnel, for example,
have been offered bribes by drug smugglers on numerous occasions
and several employees have been arrested for accepting bribes and
other integrity violations in recent years. 44 This problem could
worsen if Customs employees, "because of their own drug use, were
to become unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics"
or, even worse, were tempted to accept bribes and help "facilitate
importation of sizable drug shipments or block apprehension of dangerous criminals."'45
The Court stressed that the Customs Service also has a compelling interest in preventing the promotion of drug users to jobs that
require the employee to carry a firearm, even if the employee is not
directly involved in the interdiction of drugs. 4 An employee who
carries a weapon and who may have to use deadly force clearly discharges duties fraught with risks of injury to others and cannot afford to suffer from the impaired perception and judgment that typically accompany illicit drug use.' 47 The Customs Service therefore
has a duty to protect the public safety by minimizing the possibility
that drug-impaired employees will be promoted to positions in which
they may have to use firearms.148
The next step in the majority's reasonableness analysis was to
weigh the Customs Service's compelling interests in ensuring employee integrity and protecting public safety against the urine-testing
program's interference with the privacy interests of the covered employees. Although conceding that the collection and subsequent
chemical analysis of an individual's urine sample represented an invasion of privacy that "could be substantial in some circum142. Id. at 1391-92.
143. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1989).
144. Id. at 1392-93. Justice Kennedy cited Customs Service publications reporting a
total of 76 arrests of Service employees during the 1985, 1986, and 1987 fiscal years. Id.
However, the Court did not specify how many of these arrests involved drug-related crimes.
145. Id. at 1393.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393 (1989).
Citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that police use of deadly force to
capture an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing felon constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the
fourth amendment), Justice Kennedy cleverly made the point that by taking steps to protect
the public from possible misuse of firearms by its agents, the Customs Service actually had
done something to "[f]urther Fourth Amendment values." Id.
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stances," '149 Justice Kennedy nonetheless contended that the Customs testing program was not impermissibly intrusive in light of the
"operational realities of the workplace."' 150 Just as employees of the
United States Mint should expect to be subject to routine personal
searches when they leave work every day, Customs employees who
carry weapons and/or work in the drug-enforcement area should expect effective inquiries into their fitness and probity.1 5 ' Accordingly,
Customs employees seeking dangerous jobs that call for unusually
high levels of integrity and physical fitness simply must realize that
they "have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test.' 1 52 The Customs Service's testing procedures, the Court added, "significantly minimize the program's intrusion on privacy interests" by limiting testing to
applicants for covered positions who know at the outset of the drugtest requirement and who are told in advance of the testing date.5'
Justice Kennedy singled out two of the arguments pressed by
the National Treasury Employees Union for special criticism. First,
the petitioners' brief had stressed that there was little or no evidence
of a drug problem among Customs employees and that only five employees out of 3600 tested so far had tested positive for drugs. 54 But
Justice Kennedy responded that the Von Raab majority viewed this
contention as evincing "an unduly narrow view of the context in
which the Service's testing program was implemented.' 55 There can
be no doubt, the majority asserted, that drug abuse is a serious problem in the American workplace and that the Customs Service is not
immune.' 56 Since many Customs agents are not subject to the kind
of day-to-day supervision and scrutiny possible in more traditional
office situations, detecting drug impairment among Customs employees is especially difficult.' 57 Moreover, the "almost unique mission"
of the Service gives it a compelling interest in preventing off-the-job
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1393-94.
151. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that "those who join our military or intelligence services
...also may expect intrusive inquiries" into their trustworthiness and physical fitness. Id.
152. Id. at 1394.
153. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1394 n.2
(1989). Other factors cited by Justice Kennedy as reducing the intrusiveness of the program
are (1)that urine samples may only be tested for the specified illegal drugs; (2) that employees
need not disclose personal medical information unless they test positive; and (3) that the combination of EMIT and GC/MS tests "is highly accurate, assuming proper storage, handling,
and measurement techniques." Id.
154. Id. at 1394.
155. Id. at 1395.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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drug abuse because such off-duty use adds significantly to the risks
of bribery and blackmail.' 58
As the majority viewed it, the fact that all but a few of the
employees tested have proved to be innocent of drug abuse should be
regarded not as impugning the testing program's validity, but as
demonstrating the program's strength. 61 9 Since one of the major purposes of the program is to deter the abuse of drugs by employees, a
low number of positive test results, reasoned Justice Kennedy, should
be logically viewed as "a hallmark of success."'I6 Nearly all of the
motorists stopped and searched at border checkpoints and a vast majority of the people subjected to suspicionless searches when they
seek to board commercial airlines also prove to be innocent of any
wrongdoing, but that does not prove that border stops or airport
searches are unnecessary or ineffective. 161 These practices have been
held to be constitutional 162 because the government has a compelling
interest in guarding against great potential harm and "preventing an
otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading to the particular
context."' 6 Similar justifications apply to the Customs drug-testing
program, reasoned Justice Kennedy. The importance of preventing
the possible harms that would result if drug abuse were to become a
significant problem in the Customs Service "furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal."' 6"
A second argument made by the attorneys for the Treasury Employees Union also was rejected by the Von Raab majority. The petitioners had contended that because drug-abusing employees could
easily avoid detection by surreptitious adulteration of their urine
samples or by temporary abstinence, the Customs Service's testing
scheme was not a "sufficiently productive mechanism" to justify its
intrusions into employee privacy interests. 6"5 In response, Justice
Kennedy maintained that, in view of the precautions built into the
158. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1989).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1395 n.3.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of suspicionless stops and visual inspections of motor vehicles at fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974)
(upholding the validity of suspicionless searches of all passengers seeking to board commercial
flights as well as searches of carry-on luggage).
163. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 n.3
(1989).
164. Id. at 1395.
165. Id. at 1394-96.
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urine collection process, no employee could reasonably expect to succeed in adulterating the sample. 16 6 Similarly, he argued that no employee could confidently expect to avoid detection by abstaining after
the test date is assigned. 6 7 The majority cited evidence that the
length of time it takes for particular drugs to become undetectable in
urine varies widely among people and may extend for as long as
twenty-two days.' 6 8 Employees cannot predict their individual pattern of elimination for a particular drug with perfect accuracy and,
in fact, may not be knowledgeable concerning the "fade-away" periods of given drugs. 69 Furthermore, some employees may have such a
severe drug problem that they may be unable to abstain even for a
70
short period of time.1
Having declared its confidence in the integrity and effectiveness
of the Customs Service's testing procedures, the majority concluded
with a one-sentence summary of the results of its reasonableness test:
The Government's compelling interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the
integrity of our Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to [the
covered] positions, who enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical
demands of those positions.'
(b) Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.-Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, filed a one-paragraph dissenting opinion
that referred to the reasons for his dissent in the Railway Labor
Executives case. 172 Deploring the Von Raab majority's abandonment
of the probable cause requirement as "unprincipled and unjustifiable," Justice Marshall charged that the majority had applied its
own reasonableness test in an erroneous manner, and stated his and
Justice Brennan's agreement with the other Von Raab dissenting
opinion. 17 To the surprise of some (but not all) legal scholars, the
second dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Scalia and was
joined by Justice Stevens. In no uncertain terms, Justice Scalia ex166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
(Marshall,

Id. at 1396.
Id.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1396 (1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1397-98.
Id. at 1398 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1398 (1989)
J., dissenting).
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plained why he viewed the Customs Service testing program as "a
kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use."'""
At the core of Justice Scalia's dissent was disagreement with
the majority's brushing aside of the union's contention that there
was simply no existing evidence of a drug problem among Customs
Service employees. Justice Scalia had voted with the Railway Labor
Executives majority, he explained, because the Federal Railroad Administration succeeded in compiling ample evidence of drug and alcohol abuse among railroad employees and in showing that such
abuse could seriously endanger the public safety.' 7 5 It was important
to note, he added, that the Court had upheld the validity of warrantless searches of school students by school officials only after reviewing well-documented evidence that drug use and violent crime were
growing problems in American schools.' 76 Similarly, the Court had
approved the use of fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border to
stop and search cars only after examining statistics indicating that
the problem of stemming the flow of illegal aliens across our borders
had reached crisis proportions.' 77 But in the present case, as Justice
Scalia put it, "[tlhe Court's opinion. . . will be searched in vain for
real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by urine testing of
Customs employees." ' 78
The majority's analysis, Justice Scalia declared, was filled with
broad generalizations about the severity of the national drug problem, vague references to occasional bribe-taking by Customs officers,
and speculation that drug-impaired employees could jeopardize public safety or become unsympathetic to their drug-enforcement mission. 179 What was "revealingly absent" from the government's briefs
and the majority opinion "[was] the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred; an
instance, that is, in which the cause of bribe-taking, or of poor aim,
or of unsympathetic law enforcement. . . was drug use." 18 Although Justice Kennedy's majority opinion alluded to several cases
of bribe-taking and other integrity violations by Customs employees,
174. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1398-99. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
177. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 551-52 (1976).
178. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1399 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1399-1400.
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none of these cases had been linked to drug use.'' It was particularly telling, according to Justice Scalia, that William Von Raab, the
Commissioner of Customs himself, stated that "Customs is largely
drug-free" and that "[t]he extent of illegal drug use by Customs
employees was not the reason for establishing [the testing] program.' 182 And indeed, noted Justice Scalia, the testing results to
date, showing that only five employees out of 3600 had tested positive for drugs, demonstrated that the Customs Service was, in fact,
83
"largely drug-free.'1
Justice Scalia was especially critical of the majority's response
to the dearth of evidence of drug-related problems in the Customs
Service-Justice Kennedy's admonition that "[t]here is little reason
to believe that American workplaces are immune from [the] pervasive social problem" of illegal drug use.' 8 Such a generalization,
Justice Scalia stated, might be sufficient to justify the suspicionless
urine testing of employees in a workplace that "could produce such
catastrophic social harm that no risk whatever is tolerable-the secured areas of a nuclear power plant, for example."' 8 5 Vague generalizations and mere speculation, however, do not justify intrusive
bodily searches, without reasonable suspicion, of all employees who
work in any kind of law enforcement capacity.' 8
Pointing out that the Von Raab decision arguably would have
the effect of allowing the urine testing of all public employees who
are required to carry firearms, 8 7 Justice Scalia expressed doubt that
urine testing will prove to be "even marginally more effective in
preventing gun-carrying agents from risking 'impaired perception
and judgment' than is their current knowledge that, if impaired, they
may be shot dead in unequal combat with unimpaired smugglersunless. . . their addiction is so severe that no urine test is needed for
detection."' 8 8 Nevertheless, he continued, the Von Raab Court's approval of suspicionless urine testing of weapons-carrying employees
would almost certainly be cited as precedent for upholding laws permitting the suspicionless testing of all employees, public and private,
181. Id. at 1400. See supra note 144.
182. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1400 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting id. at 1395).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1400-01
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1399.
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whose work, if performed under the influence of drugs, could possibly endanger public safety.1"
Justice Scalia concluded with some speculation of his own. The
feeble justifications for the Customs testing program that had been
offered by the government and accepted by the Von Raab majority
had convinced him, he wrote, that the real reason for the testing
program was one cited by the Commissioner of Customs in his memorandum to employees announcing the program: "Implementation of
the drug screening program would set an important example in our
country's struggle with this most serious threat to our national
health and security."1 90 In other words, the Customs program was
not based upon a sincere belief that urine testing will prevent some
serious harm resulting from employee drug use; it was primarily intended to demonstrate the government's determination to win its
'
"war on drugs."191
This justification, however, is an unacceptable
one because "the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the
means of making a point [and] symbolism, even symbolism for so
worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an
otherwise unreasonable search." ' By subjecting its employees to
such needless assaults on their privacy and dignity, the government,
in Justice Scalia's view, had succeeded in demonstrating the sagacity
of Justice Brandeis' often-quoted warning: "The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding."1 93 Justice Scalia concluded:
Those who lose because of

. .

. the present exercise of sym-

bolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity is thus offended, but all of us . . . who become subject to
the administration of federal officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly be greater than the small respect they have

been taught to have for their own. 9 "

(c) Analysis.-Despite Justice Scalia's eloquence, the Railway
Labor Executives and Von Raab cases, taken together, can be

viewed as having created a "drug-testing exception" to the traditional warrant and probable cause (or at least reasonable suspicion)
189. Id. at 1401.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1400-01.
192. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1400-01
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1402 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
194. Id.
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requirements of the fourth amendment.1 95 Both decisions authorize
urine testing of certain categories of public employees even in the
absence of any facts or evidence amounting to reasonable or individualized suspicion that particular employees are using drugs or are
involved in any kind of drug-related wrongdoing. Although the majority opinions in both cases never specifically refer to a drug-testing
exception, the majority Justices make it clear that both decisions rest
upon the idea that under certain circumstances or situations, the
warrantless and suspicionless drug testing of government employees
falls in the category of a "special need," beyond the normal need for
law enforcement. This, in turn, justifies the judicial use of a reasonableness analysis-balancing the individual's privacy interests against
the government's interests in such goals as protecting public safety
and ensuring the integrity of the work force-rather than a more
traditional fourth amendment analysis. Neither decision, however,
makes it clear whether, because of the pervasive social problem of
drug abuse, all public-employee drug-testing programs fall in the
special needs category. If the Court eventually answers "yes" to this
question, it would not be unrealistic to predict that a wide variety of
public-employee testing programs will survive judicial scrutiny.
In particular, the Von Raab decision is certain to be cited as
precedent for upholding a wide variety of drug-testing programs, including programs that are more destructive of individual privacy expectations than the plan implemented by the Customs Service. The
Von Raab holding arguably applies only to the pre-promotion or pretransfer testing of incumbent employees who, with full knowledge of
the drug-test requirement, make a decision to seek a high-risk or
safety-sensitive position. Von Raab does not necessarily bestow the
Supreme Court's approval on more intrusive drug-testing schemes
(i.e., random urine testing) or on drug-testing plans designed for
public employees who do not perform duties that could endanger
public safety if performed under the influence of drugs. Nevertheless, most lower courts can be expected to hold that there are certain
categories of employees who, simply by virtue of the nature of their
job, can be subjected to drug-testing procedures that clearly infringe
privacy expectations to a greater degree than the procedures upheld
in Von Raab.
For example, it would be surprising if more than a few federal
or state courts interpret Von Raab so narrowly as to refuse to oermit
unannounced periodic blood and urine testing of incumbent police
195,

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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officers (or any employees authorized to carry firearms), correctional
officers, fire fighters, train and trolley operators, bus drivers, airline
pilots, air traffic controllers, nuclear power plant workers, and other
employees in positions that are irrefutably safety-sensitive. Some
courts, however, may attempt to distinguish between jobs that are
highly safety-sensitive and those that are merely somewhat safetysensitive. Is a bulldozer operator, for example, in as safety-sensitive a
job as an airline pilot? The lower federal and state courts may have
little choice but to engage in the very kind of judicial line drawing
that the Supreme Court eschewed in Von Raab.
What makes the Von Raab holding especially problematic is the
majority's failure to articulate clear analytical principles or guidelines that can enable employers and judges to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible drug-testing schemes with greater
precision. The majority opinions in Von Raab and Railway Labor
Executives omitted the more helpful, explicitly two-part reasonableness inquiry employed in O'Connor v. Ortega196 and other "special
needs" cases. Instead, the Court used a broad, multifactor reasonableness analysis that purported to examine all the relevant factors in
balancing individual privacy expectations against the government's
interests in drug testing.
This approach obviously is vague and malleable enough to be
manipulated by partisan litigants and results-oriented jurists. It tells
us nothing about the relative importance of the various factors that
are to be weighed against one another in such an analysis, and thus
creates more confusion than necessary even in a new and emerging
area of law. Is it no longer necessary for employers to show that a
search is justified at its inception? Should Von Raab be read to
mean that it makes no difference whatsoever whether or not employers can document an existing drug problem among covered employees? To what extent does permitting the employees to donate urine
samples in private lessen the intrusiveness of the urine-collection process? What about employees who do not perform safety-sensitive
jobs but whose integrity is of great importance-teachers, lawyers
or, for that matter, judges? Can such employees be subjected to preemployment testing? To testing as part of an annual physical examination? To random testing? These are among the many questions
that remain unanswered in the wake of the Von Raab and Railway
Labor Executives decisions. In effect, the Supreme Court has declared that public-employee drug-testing programs must be evalu196.

480 U.S. 709 (1987). See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.

JAR WARS

ated on a case-by-case basis, using a broad, multifactor balancing
test that raises more questions than it answers. Following is an examination of some of the more important drug-testing questions that
have yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
IV.

Unresolved Drug-Testing Questions

A.

Testing as Part of a Routine Periodic Physical Examination

On June 19, 1989, very late in its 1988-89 term, the Supreme
Court announced its decision in a third drug-testing case. The decision, however, settled only the narrow issue of whether Conrail, the
nation's largest private railroad company, had violated the federal
Railway Labor Act by requiring its employees to undergo urine testing as part of routine periodic physical examinations. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,197 the
Court was presented with the question of whether Conrail's imposition of the urine tests over the unions' objections posed a "minor
dispute" or a "major dispute" under federal labor law. Under the
Railway Labor Act, which governs the railroad and airline industries, a major dispute is a change in working conditions that is not
covered in the existing contract 1 98 Such a dispute must be resolved
by collective bargaining or arbitration procedures, with the unions
retaining the right to strike.' 99 Until the dispute procedures are exhausted, management cannot unilaterally impose the contested
change.20 0 On the other hand, a minor dispute is defined as one involving the interpretation of an existing contract.2 0 Management
can unilaterally institute the change, and the unions' recourse is essentially limited to seeking binding arbitration. 0 2
The railway labor unions contended that the addition of a drugtesting component to employees' physical examinations despite union
opposition was a major dispute and that Conrail thus could not impose the drug tests without negotiating with the unions as part of the
collective bargaining process.20 3 But Justice Blackmun, writing for a
seven-to-two majority, agreed with Conrail management that the addition of a drug-testing component to routine physical examinations
197. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
198. Id. at 2480.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2480.
201. Id.
202. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477,
2480-81 (1989).
203. Id. at 2483.
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was only a minor change in the existing labor-management contract
and that Conrail's arguments were "neither frivolous nor obviously
insubstantial" in asserting that the existing contract permitted the
change.204 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the question of the fairness of adding urine testing to the existing physical examination requirement was a minor dispute under the Railway Labor Act and
should be subject to the arbitration process, not to collective bargain-

ing.1°5 In the meantime, Conrail could continue its drug-testing program. Justice Blackmun stressed that the Court's decision was
merely an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act and that the
Court was taking no position "on the merits of the dispute." ' 6 Thus
it is still possible that the unions may succeed in derailing the tests

when they take their arguments to arbitration.
Although the Consolidated Rail Corp. decision did not settle
the question of the constitutionality of urine testing as part of a railroad employee's routine periodic physical examination, there can be
little doubt as to how the Supreme Court will eventually resolve the

issue. The lower courts have expressed virtually unanimous agreement that the fourth amendment does not prohibit employers from
204. Id. at 2485. The unions argued that Conrail's imposition of drug testing as part of
periodic physical examinations constituted a substantial departure from the current collective
bargaining agreement because, unlike Conrail's past medical examination program, the new
program (1) included testing without reasonable cause; (2) can result in an employee's firing;
and (3) constitutes regulation of the private, off-duty activities of employees. Id. at 2487. But
Justice Blackmun pointed out that reasonable suspicion has not been held to be necessary to
justify drug testing for medical purposes and that Conrail policy would not result in the firing
of an employee on the basis of a single positive drug test. Id. at 2488-89. The Court thus
concluded that "lilt is surely at least arguable that Conrail's use of drug testing in physical
examinations has a medical rather than a disciplinary goal." Id. at 2489. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, stated his agreement with the unions' position, commenting that "[ilt is inconceivable to me that in so doing [agreeing to medical drug
testing] the unions were also agreeing to the systematic, suspicionless testing, on such terms
and in such manner as the employer alone prescribed, of all employees for evidence of criminal
activity that, under the employer's plan, could result in discharge." Id. at 2490 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
205. 109 S. Ct. at 2489. In summary dispositions without written opinions, the Supreme
Court on June 26, 1989 ordered the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to
reexamine its rulings concerning drug and alcohol testing for rail workers employed by the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) in light of its holding in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989). See SEPTA
v. Transportation Workers Union, Local 234, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989) and United Transportation Union, Local 234 v. SEPTA, 109 S. Ct. 3209 (1989). In Transportation Workers Union v.
SETPA, 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of random drug testing of rail workers in safety-sensitive positions, but classified the dispute as a
major dispute under the Railway Labor Act, thus barring SEPTA from unilaterally implementing its random-testing program. In light of the Consolidated Rail Corp. decision, the
Third Circuit may reclassify the dispute as minor, thereby giving SEPTA the authority to
impose the testing program on its workers pending the results of arbitration.
206. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2489
(1989).
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requiring public employees (or private employees in government-reg-

ulated industries) in safety-sensitive positions to submit to urinalysis
as part of a routine periodic physical examination. 0 7 It is certainly
arguable, however, that mandatory drug testing as part of a routine
physical examination does constitute an unreasonable search when
applied to employees whose job performance, if impaired by drugs,
poses little or no threat to public safety. For example, in Jones v.
McKenzie,'" a federal district court declared that school bus attend-

ants, who merely assisted handicapped students in travelling by bus,
could not be forced to undergo urine testing as part of an annual
physical examination.20 9 The court acknowledged, however, that bus
drivers and mechanics could reasonably be expected to submit to
such suspicionless testing because their jobs are directly related to
the safety of school children.2 10
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court's decision with respect to the testing of
the attendants.2 1 ' Pointing out that a handicapped child could be
dropped by a drug-impaired attendant or ignored while crossing a
hazardous street, the appeals court asserted that "the safety concern
may be somewhat greater for a school bus driver, [but] it is still
quite significant in the case of an employee who is responsible for
supervising, attending, and carrying handicapped children. 2 1 The
court concluded that drug testing, "as a part of a routine, reasonably
required, employment-related medical examination" is permissible,
even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of drug use, "where there
is a clear nexus between the test and the employer's legitimate safety
concern."2 The same conclusion has been reached by other federal
207. See, e.g., Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 733-34 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Harris v. Washington, No. 84-C-8812, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. II1. 1985); McDonell v. Hunter,
612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130, n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified on other grounds, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985). But see Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J., Local 318 v. Washington Township, 672
F. Supp. 779, 794-95 (D.N.J. 1987) (enjoining drug testing of police officers as part of an
annual medical examination because it violated officers' fourth amendment rights), rev'd, 850
F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding both random drug testing and drug testing as part of an
annual physical examination on the ground that both testing programs fall under the "administrative search exception" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
208. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.C.C. 1986).
209. Id. at 1508-09.
210. Id. at 1508.
211. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989).
212. Id. at 340.
213. Id. at 336.
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and state courts2" 4 and is likely eventually to gain the approbation of
the Supreme Court.
B.

Pre-Employment Drug Testing

A closely related issue is whether prospective public employees
have fourth amendment protection from government-mandated urine
testing. Pre-employment testing, of course, differs little from the prepromotion testing approved in the Von Raab decision. Even before
Von Raab, there appeared to be an emerging consensus that preemployment drug testing, as part of a pre-employment physical ex-

amination, is constitutionally permissible for employees applying for
safety-sensitive positions.21 5 For example, in Alverado v. Washington
Public Power Supply,"" the Washington Supreme Court held that
the prospective employees of a contractor working for a federally
regulated nuclear power plant had no fourth amendment right to refuse to undergo urinalysis as part of a pre-employment medical eval-

uation.21 7 To reach this conclusion, the Washington court did not
employ a reasonableness analysis of the type the United States Supreme Court relied upon in the Railway Labor Executives and Von
Raab cases. Instead, the Alverado court determined that the urine
testing of prospective nuclear power plant workers fell into the cate-

gory of the administrative search exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment.
The Washington Supreme Court pointed out that the U.S. Su-

preme Court has consistently held that administrative searches are
constitutionally tolerable as an exception to the warrant requirement
for such pervasively regulated industries as the nuclear power industry.218 But even in such industries, the Washington tribunal cautioned, "the test for constitutional validity goes beyond a simple
214. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
215. See Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149, 154-56 (D.N.J. 1988) (upholding random
testing of recruits at state corrections officer training academy even though corrections department policy allows testing of incumbent corrections officers only on the basis of individualized
suspicion). See also Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 647 F. Supp. 875, 881 n.7 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), affid on other grounds, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); McDonell v. Hunter, 612
F. Supp. 1122, 1130 n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified on other grounds, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th
Cir. 1987); Dozier v. New York City, 130 A.D.2d 128, 519 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1987) (sustaining
terminations of probationary civil service employees for testing positive on pre-employment
urine tests).
216. 759 P.2d 427 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
217. Id. at 435.
218. Id. at 433. See, for example, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyards); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (underground and surface mines);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms and munitions dealers); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor businesses).
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weighing of governmental versus individual interests."21 9 In this instance, the pre-employment testing program passed constitutional
muster only because the Washington justices were convinced that
the program (1) furthered the "substantial government interest" of
protecting public safety; (2) was "necessary [because it] is virtually
the only way [to] effectively monitor compliance"; and (3) "contains
'constitutionally adequate substitutes' for a warrant [in that] all prospective employees are informed well in advance that a urinalysis
will be necessary before they are hired for work."2 2
Although the Alverado decision upheld the constitutionality of a
pre-employment urine-testing program, the Washington Supreme
Court's reliance upon a careful administrative search analysis rather
than a broad multifactor balancing test suggests that some pre-employment testing programs might not gain that court's approval. Legal commentators, however, generally view pre-employment drug
screening as the least objectionable form of drug testing, 22 ' and several federal and state courts have declared that employees seeking
safety-sensitive government jobs have no fourth amendment right to
refuse drug testing. 2 In light of its Railway Labor Executives' and
Von Raab holdings, the U.S. Supreme Court can be expected to
reach a similar conclusion sometime in the near future. Indeed, the
Court could go so far as to determine that pre-employment urine
testing, even when it is not part of a physical examination, is permissible for all prospective public employees, not just for those seeking
safety-sensitive jobs.
C. Testing an Employee on the Basis of an Employer's Unsupported Suspicions
It now appears beyond doubt that a public employer can require
urine testing when there is a reasonable suspicion that a particular
employee is impaired or under the influence of drugs while at
work.22 s This means, among other things, that an employer who sus219. Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427, 435 (Wash. 1988).
220. Id. at 435-36.
221. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 991-92; Note, Employee Privacy Rights v. Business Needs: Drug Testing in the Workplace 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 413, 417 (1987).
222. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
223. The testing Regulations approved in Railway Labor Executives include a provision
allowing urine testing when two supervisors agree that there is reasonable suspicion to believe
that an employee is under the influence of drugs, but only when at least one of the supervisors
has received specialized training in detecting drug intoxication. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1409-10 (1989). See also., Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507,
1511 (11 th Cir. 1987); Wrightsell v..City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986); City of Palm Bay v.
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pects drug use by a particular employee does not have to meet the
more difficult standard of probable cause to compel the employee to
undergo urinalysis.2 2 What remains unclear is whether the employer
must establish the existence of reasonable or individualized suspi-

cion before compelling the employee to undergo testing.225
The Supreme Court's drug-testing decisions of the 1988-89
term approved suspicionless drug testing only in the specific context
of post-accident testing 26 and pre-promotion or pre-transfer testing117 of all employees seeking certain high-risk law enforcement

jobs. Neither decision is applicable to a situation in which employees
are singled out for compulsory urinalysis because of an employer's
unsupported suspicions of drug use. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions, numerous courts held that forcing a particular employee to

submit to urine testing on less than reasonable suspicion was not permissible.22 8 Unless the Supreme Court eventually goes so far as to
approve standardless urine testing of individual employees at the un-

trammeled discretion of their government employers, reasonable suspicion is likely to continue to be the predominant standard applied in

cases in which an employee has been selected for urinalysis solely on
the basis of a supervisor's suspicion of illegal drug use.

Although the reasonable suspicion standard lacks some specificity, inchoate, unspecified suspicions or inarticulate hunches do not
amount to reasonable suspicion. Many courts have evaluated the reasonableness of the suspicion that a particular employee is using

drugs by examining the criteria adopted by a Second Circuit panel
in a 1984 decision forbidding suspicionless searches of prison guards.
In Security & Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82 v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.
351, 353, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679, 681 (1986), affd sub horn. Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840, 507
N.E.2d 296, 514 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1987).
224. One authority on drug-testing law has argued that drug testing should not be added
to the narrow category of searches that can be justified on suspicion less than probable cause.
See Bookspan, supra note 66, at 378-83.
225. See supra notes 48-49.
226. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
227. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
228. See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1144 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1636 (1989); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308-09
(8th Cir. 1987); Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (D.N.J.
1988); Smith v. White, 666 F. Supp. 1085, 1089 (E.D. Tenn. 1987), affd, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th
Cir. 1988); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1986). See also Allen v.
City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489-91 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (upheld urine testing and subsequent firings of city employees who worked around high voltage electric wires without explicitly citing reasonable suspicion standard, but facts of case arguably show that city had cited
facts amounting to reasonable suspicion).
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2 9 the court stressed that reasonable suspicion requires that
Carey,1
the suspicion must be directed at a particular individual and that
employers "must point to specific objective facts and rational inferences that they are entitled to draw from those facts in light of their
experience. 230 The Carey court suggested four factors that may be
considered in determining reasonable suspicion: "(1) the nature of
the tip or information; (2) the reliability of the informant; (3) the
degree of corroboration; and (4) other facts contributing to suspicion
231
or lack thereof.
This four-part standard was utilized by a Third Circuit panel in
Copeland v. PhiladelphiaPolice Department,3 2 a 1988 case involving the termination of a Philadelphia police officer who had tested
positive for cannabinoids. The court sustained both the compulsory
urinalysis and subsequent firing on the grounds that another police
officer's allegation that she had seen the plaintiff use illegal drugs
was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.233 The fired officer
contended that the reasonable suspicion standard had not been satisfied because the accusing officer, who was his former girlfriend, subsequently recanted her accusation and a two-month investigation unearthed no evidence in support of the original allegations. 23 Despite
the lack of corroboration and the fact that all four parts of the Carey
standard were not present, the court concluded that "[tihe first-hand
observation of a police officer that Copeland had used illegal drugs in
her presence within the previous several months" provided ample evidence of wrongdoing and was sufficient to constitute reasonable
suspicion."'
The Carey criteria were applied by another Third Circuit panel
in a 1989 decision upholding the compulsory urinalyses of four Philadelphia police officers. 2 6 After a community leader complained
that he and other residents of a West Philadelphia neighborhood had
seen on-duty police officers using drugs, an Internal Affairs surveillance team observed four officers regularly congregating behind the
neighborhood's tennis courts with their car lights turned off.237 The
229. 737 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1984).
230. 737 F.2d at 205 (quoting Hunter v. Auyer, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982)).
231. 737 F.2d at 205 (citing United States v. Afandor, 567 F.2d 1325, 1329 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
232. 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
233. Id. at 1144.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989).
237. Id. at 76.
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surveillance officers reported that the four on-duty officers were engaging in fast, erratic driving and were seen producing a "brief flash
of fire" consistent with the use of "crack cocaine."23 8 The court held
that this evidence was strong enough to satisfy the Carey criteria
and justify the urinalysis order because "[t]he complaint that precipitated the investigation (1) came from an apparently reliable source;
(2) included detailed accounts of observations made by a number of
different people on a number of different occasions; and (3) was corrroborated in important respects by subsequent surveillance on the
scene by the Internal Affairs Officers."239
A slightly different definition of reasonable suspicion was articulated by a Florida appellate court when it struck down a city's plan
to implement random urine testing of all of its police officers and fire
fighters. In City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, " ° the Florida tribunal
cited Carey in support of the proposition that drug testing could only
be done on the basis of reasonable suspicion.241 The court noted that
reasonable suspicion is often referred to as "founded suspicion" by
Florida courts.242 The court defined founded suspicion as "something
less than probable cause, but something more than mere suspicion ' 243 and as "suspicion which has some factual foundation in the
surrounding circumstances observed by the officer when those situa2' 44
tions are interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit took the reasonable suspicion standard, as applied in the drug-testing context, further
than most courts. In McDonell v. Hunter,4 5 the court held that
urine testing of prison employees could be done on a uniform or random basis.241 The McDonell court, however, declared that an employee not selected in such a manner could not be compelled to undergo urinalysis in the absence of "a reasonable suspicion based on
specific objective facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those
facts in light of experience that the employee is then under the influence of drugs or alcohol or that the employee has used a controlled
substance within the twenty-four hour period prior to the required
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 78.
475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 1325-26.
Id. at 1326.
Id. (quoting State v. Hunt, 391 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
475 So. 2d at 1326.
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
See id. at 1308.
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test."247 In addition to mandating that prison officials adhere to the

reasonable suspicion standard, the Eighth Circuit panel made it
clear that the officials must accord suspected employees certain procedural protections. The demand for a urine specimen must be made
only on the express authority of the highest official present in the
prison, and the specific facts amounting to reasonable suspicion must
be disclosed to the employee at the time the demand is made.248
Prison officials are expected to establish strict guidelines to assure
that the test results are kept confidential249 and, above all, "[tihe
equipment and procedure to be used must provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to permit [prison officials] to accurately determine the presence or absence of both drugs and alcohol in the
urine. 250

Other courts have defined reasonable suspicion with much less
precision and with no mention of any accompanying procedural protections. 251 For example, in Turner v. FraternalOrder of Police,25 2
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a police department regulation requiring officers to submit to
urinalysis "if suspected of drug use" by a department official. 253 The

court noted that it was extending its approval based on the assumption that the word "suspected" would be construed as requiring "a
reasonable, objective basis to suspect that a urinalysis will produce
evidence of an illegal drug use."'2 5 The court also noted its hope that
the police department "will undertake a more artful drafting of the
regulation. 2 55 Nevertheless, the court sidestepped the opportunity to
delineate any guidelines or factors that could be used to establish the
existence of reasonable suspicion.
Notwithstanding the ambiguities surrounding the reasonable
suspicion standard and the impact of the Railway Labor Execu211 and Von Raab257 decisions, most courts can be expected to
tives
continue
to agree that an employee-even an employee in a so-called
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1308-09.
249. Id. at 1309.
250. McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987).
251. See, e.g., King v. McMickens, 120 A.D. 351, 353, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679, 681 (1986),
affd sub nom. Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840, 507 N.E.2d 296, 514 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1987)
(holding that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify testing of correctional officers, but
failing to make it clear whether reasonable suspicion was necessary).
252. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
253. Id. at 1009.
254. Id. at 1008-09.
255. Id. at 1009 n.7.
256. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
257. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989).
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safety-sensitive position-cannot be singled out for testing solely because of his or her employer's unfounded, inchoate suspicions.2"8 As
a county court in New York recently stated, "Standardless physiological searches of [the] body are antithetic to our basic constitutional rights." '59 If this emerging consensus among the lower courts
survives Supreme Court scrutiny, most cases involving a public employee's challenge to a suspicious employer's drug-testing order will
turn on each court's determination as to whether the employer has
satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard."'
D.

Uniform and Random Testing Programs

Of the major drug-testing questions still unresolved by the. U.S.
Supreme Court, the question that has prompted the greatest disagreement among the lower federal and state courts is whether, in the
absence of reasonable suspicion, a government agency can impose a
uniform 61 or random drug-testing program on its employees. Uni-

form testing and random testing raise similar constitutional ques258. A federal court in Iowa pointed out that the fourth amendment arguably does not
prohibit drug testing of a particular employee "on a periodic basis as a condition of continued
employment under a disciplinary disposition if such a condition is reasonably related to the
underlying basis for the disciplinary action and the duration of the condition is specified and is
reasonable in length." McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985),
modified on other grounds, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
259. Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd 131 A.D. 214, 520
N.Y.S.2d 551 (1987), rev'd, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988).
260. It is important to note that if an employer's urine testing order, or any other drugtesting program, is found to violate an employee's fourth amendment rights, the employer is
not likely to gain judicial approval of the order on the alternative ground that the employee
consented to drug testing by signing a consent form at the time of his or her hiring. It has long
been established that warrantless searches conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent do not
violate the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973). But the overwhelming majority of courts that have confronted the issue of employee
consent to otherwise unconstitutional searches conducted by public employers have concluded
that such consents are invalid. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1548
(6th Cir. 1988) ("We do not believe that the government should be allowed to accomplish
indirectly, absent compelling reasons what it cannot accomplish directly under the Constitution"), vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (1988) (granting rehearing en banc); National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("We hold, too, that a search
otherwise unreasonable cannot be redeemed by a public employer's exaction of a 'consent' to
the search as a condition of employment"); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th
Cir. 1987) (agreeing with district court holding that "[aidvance consent to future unreasonable searches is not a reasonable condition of employment"); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475
So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("Consent cannot be inferred from an act so
manifestly coerced"). However, a few courts have noted that it may not be inappropriate for a
court to consider the employee's consent as one of several factors to be considered in a "totality of the circumstances" determination of the extent of the employee's legitimate expectations
of privacy. See Security & Law Enforcement Employees, Dist, Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d
187, 202 n.23 (2d Cir. 1984).
261. Periodic testing of an entire class of incumbent employees, usually without advance
disclosure of the test date.
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tions. Both kinds of testing subject employees to suspicionless
searches, but if properly administered, eliminate the potential for
discrimination, arbitrariness, and other abuses of discretion by employers. 2 At this point, a majority of courts have taken the position
that public employees in safety-sensitive or critical positions can be
subjected to mandatory uniform or random testing.2 63 But individual
courts, confronted with differing fact situations, have employed differing analytical approaches and tests in deciding these kinds of
cases.
1. Von Raab Applied. Harmon v. Thornburg.-The first major drug-testing case to be decided in the aftermath of the Railway
Labor Executives 6 4 and Von Raab 265 decisions involved a challenge
to a random drug-testing plan. In Harmon v. Thornburg, 6 decided
June 30, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit relied heavily on the Von Raab decision to analyze
262. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating
opinion that both roadblock-type stops of all motorists and discretionless random stops of motorists (such as stopping every tenth car to pass a ce'rtain point) would be permissible under
the fourth amendment, but suggesting that random discretionless stops are less intrusive).
Compare United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (prohibiting random, suspicionless border area automobile stops) with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (permitting suspicionless border area stops and visual inspections of all automobiles at
fixed checkpoints).
263. See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (permitting random testing of U.S. Justice Department employees with access to "top secret national security
information" but upholding injunction against random testing of federal prosecutors generally); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (Ist Cir.) (approving random testing of Boston police
officers who participate in drug interdiction or who carry firearms), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
404 (1989); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J., Local 318 v. Washington Township, 850
F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding random testing of police officers), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1637 (1989); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
uniform and random testing of nuclear power plant employees); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (permitting uniform and random testing of prison guards); Hartness v.
Bush, 712 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1989) (approving uniform and random testing of General
Services Administration (GSA) employees who carry firearms but enjoining testing of other
GSA employees and employees in the Executive Office of the President); Caruso v. Ward, 72
N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988) (upholding random testing of members of an elite voluntary corps of New York City Police Officers, 90% of whom participate in
hazardous drug-law enforcement). But see, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d
1539 (6th Cir.) (rejecting uniform testing of fire fighters), vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir.
1988) (granting rehearing en banc); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir.) (rejecting
uniform testing of police officers), vacated, 862 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting rehearing
en banc); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Thornburgh, 720 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (reaffirming order granting a preliminary injunction against random testing of employees of Federal Bureau of Prisons); Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 524 A.2d 430 (1987) (enjoining uniform testing of members of
police narcotics unit).
264. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
265. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
266. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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the constitutionality of a United States Department of Justice (Justice Department or DOJ) plan requiring employees in sensitive positions to submit to urinalysis on a random basis.
Under the Justice Department plan, five categories of incumbent employees may be subjected to random drug testing: (1) attorneys prosecuting criminal cases; (2) employees with access to grand
jury proceedings; (3) employees holding "top secret" national security clearances; (4) employees appointed by the President; and (5)
employees whose duties include maintaining, storing, or safeguarding
a controlled substance.26 7 The plan requires that employees randomly selected for testing must be notified on the same day, preferably within two hours of the scheduled testing. 268 At the testing site,
the employee is supervised by a monitor of the same gender, but is
allowed to urinate within a stall or partitioned area. To guard
against adulteration of the specimen, the toilet water is tinted with a
bluing agent and the monitor inspects the sample to ascertain that it
is of normal color and temperature.26 9 Collected specimens are then
sent to a laboratory that employs the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Test (EMIT) to detect marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, or phencyclidine.2 71 Any samples testing positive are retested, using the more precise gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) technique. If the second test confirms the positive result, a medical review officer reviews the test results, giving the employee the opportunity to discuss and possibly explain the positive
finding. 2 7' If the officer verifies the positive result, the employee is
removed from his sensitive position and is subject to disciplinary ac2 72
tion, including the possibility of being fired.
The district court, noting the absence of any documented drug
problem within the Justice Department, found this plan to be unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction forbidding the implementation of the plan.27 a Since none of the 42 DOJ employees (including 38 attorneys) who had filed suit against the plan was a
Presidential appointee or was responsible for safeguarding controlled
267. Id. at 486.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
272. Indeed, dismissal is required after a second finding of illegal drug use. See id. at
486 n.3. For the court's description of the history and details of the Justice Department's drugtesting plan, see id. at 485-86.
273. Harmon v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 65, 70 (D.D.C. 1988), modified, 878 F.2d 484
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
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substances, the court of appeals modified the injunction accordingly,
thus permitting the random testing of workers in these two categories. 74 The Harmon case, therefore, focused only on the legitimacy
of the Justice Department's requirement of random urinalysis for
federal prosecutors, workers with access to grand jury proceedings,
and employees holding top secret national security clearances.275
Writing for a divided three-judge panel, Chief Judge Wald began her analysis of the DOJ testing scheme by assessing the impact
of the Railway Labor Executives and Von Raab holdings on the present litigation. Of the two, the Von Raab decision, she pointed out,
was more closely on point.27 Unlike the Justice Department testing
regulations, the regulations upheld in the Railway Labor Executives
case made drug testing contingent upon an event-a major train accident, a rule violation, or some other concrete evidence that employees had not performed their jobs in a proper manner.2 7 7 Although
the Federal Railroad Administration's post-accident testing does not
require individualized suspicion of particular employees, it at least
requires a triggering event indicating some dereliction of duty on the
part of one or more employees.2 78 By contrast, the testing program
upheld in Von Raab, like the Justice Department's program, re2 79
quired no evidence that employees failed to perform satisfactorily.
Chief Judge Wald pointed out, however, that although the Von
Raab decision was the proper case to be applied to the facts of the
present controversy, Von Raab was not perfectly on point.28 ° For example, in its efforts to justify the Customs Service's testing program,
the Von Raab majority noted that the detection of drug use on the
part of Customs agents is especially difficult because these employees
spend much of their time in the field and are thus not subject to the
" '
day-to-day scrutiny that is typical in most office environments. 28
Justice Department employees, on the other hand, work in the kind
of traditional office environment in which drug impairment almost
certainly could be detected without resorting to urinalysis. 8 2 In the
D.C. panel's view, this factor was "surely one element to be weighed
274. See Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
275. Id. at 487.
276. Id. at 488.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
280. Id. at 488-89.
281. Id. at 489 (citing Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395).
282. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489.
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in the balance," but it was not "one of overriding significance." 28' 3
A much more important distinction between the testing program upheld in Von Raab and the Justice Department's plan, according to Chief Judge Wald, is that the Customs program mandates testing only on a single occasion and only for employees who
knowingly trigger the obligation to undergo testing by deciding to
seek transfer or promotion to a covered position. 84 Customs employees who strenuously object to urine testing can simply elect to keep
their present positions. Justice Department employees, by contrast,
would have little choice in the matter.185 A DOJ worker who refused
to be tested would face the loss of his or her job.28 Indeed, because

the Justice Department plan authorizes the random testing of incumbent employees on a continuing basis, an employee who has done a
good job for many years and who wants only to keep his or her present position "could, at least in theory, be subjected to repeated test'
ing over the course of his [or her] career." 287
Although the appeals panel opined that the invasion of privacy
engendered by the DOJ plan was clearly "different in kind" than the
intrusion sanctioned in Von Raab and that "a coherent theory might
be constructed which would make this a fundamental distinction,"

the court nevertheless reasoned that "the Supreme Court has not encouraged the construction of such a theory." 2 Chief Judge Wald
observed that the Von Raab Court's discussion of the limited and
voluntary nature of the Customs Service testing program "was con283. Id.
284. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For the Customs employees, there is at least some degree of consent involved in their urine tests. It is highly
unlikely, however, that the tests could therefore be justified under the consent exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements. See supra note 260.
285. Id. The fact that a Customs Service employee can avoid urinalysis by declining to
seek promotion or transfer to a covered position arguably makes the Customs testing plan
more constitutionally palatable than the Justice Department program or an) other testing program that mandates urinalysis for an entire class of incumbent employees. Cf. United States v.
Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974) (suspicionless searches of all passengers seeking
to board commercial airplanes are made less intrusive by the fact that passengers are free to
avoid the search by choosing other means of travel).
286. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989). At this point, the court
cited Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1986) in support of the proposition that "[dienial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing
job." 878 F.2d at 489 n.6. In Wygant, the Court struck down a school district employment
plan permitting layoffs of white teachers who had greater seniority than several black teachers
who were not laid off. The plurality opinion noted that affirmative action plans were preferable
to plans that include race-based layoff contingencies because "[tihough hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs
impose." 476 U.S. at 282.
287. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
288. Id.
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fined to a footnote [and] identified only as one of several factors
which, taken together, would 'significantly minimize the intrusiveness of the Service's drug-screening program.' "289 Accordingly, the
panel concluded that although the arguably more intrusive nature of
the Justice Department's testing plan was a "relevant consideration"
and might even "tip the scales" in a particularly close case, "[w]e do
not believe . . . that this aspect of the program requires us to undertake a fundamentally different analysis from that pursued by the Su2 90
preme Court in Von Raab.
Having determined that a Von Raab-type reasonableness analy-

sis rather than a more traditional fourth amendment analysis was
the appropriate standard for review, Chief Judge Wald next focused
on the validity of the Justice Department's justifications for random
testing. She analyzed the testing plan by examining each of three

governmental interests which, according to the Justice Department's
supplemental brief, had been approved by the Von Raab
Court-integrity of the workforce, public safety, and protection of
sensitive information. 91 Her method of analysis was to evaluate the
legitimacy of these interests in terms of their applicability to each of
the categories of covered DOJ employees-federal prosecutors, employees with access to grand jury proceedings, and workers holding
top secret national security clearances. 92
None of these employees, according to the Chief Judge, could

be subjected to urinalysis solely on the basis of the government's interest in ensuring the integrity of its workforce. 9a The Von Raab
decision simply could not be construed as permitting the mandatory
289. Id. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394 n.2.
290. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489. This part of the court's decision is certainly debatable
and may very well have been a close call for the two judges making up the majority. The
Justice Department's testing plan clearly differs from the Von Raab-approved program in several ways, all of which taken together arguably would justify a stricter, traditional fourth
amendment analysis rather than the multifactor reasonableness test used in the Von Raab and
Railway Labor Executives cases. Unlike the testing scheme upheld in Von Raab, the Justice
Department plan inflicts compulsory urinalysis (1)on a random schedule; (2) on a continuing
basis; (3) on an unannounced basis; (4) in the absence of a legitimate (let alone, compelling)
government public-safety interest; (5) on employees who face the loss of their job if they refuse
to comply; and (6) on employees who work in a traditional office environment where drug
impairment is, presumably, easily detected without resorting to mandatory urinalysis. Chief
Judge Wald's opinion does not mention the third factor above and arguably understates the
constitutional significance of the second and fifth factors. The author believes that a strong
case can be made that these factors do, in fact, distinguish the DOJ plan from the Customs
Service program in a constitutionally meaningful way.
291. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
292. See id. at 489-93.
293. Id. at 490.
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The Von Raab opinion,

after all, had clearly stated that "[u]nlike most private citizens or
government employees in general, employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness
and probity."'2 95 Although the government indisputably has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its employees obey the law, the Von
Raab opinion suggested that the suspicionless urine testing of em-

ployees is justified "only when a clear, direct nexus exists between
the nature of the employee's duty and the nature of the feared

violation. 296
Moreover, Chief Judge Wald pointed out that the Supreme
Court, in Von Raab, emphasized the special problems that could result because of drug use by employees directly engaged in drug interdiction.2 97 But with respect to DOJ employees, "[n]o such nexus

is present. '' 298 An employee who is a federal prosecutor or who has
access to grand jury proceedings or secret documents does not neces-

sarily have responsibility for the enforcement of federal narcotics
laws. 299 For example, such employees, unlike Customs agents, are
not in a position to be tempted by bribes from drug traffickers or by
their own access to vast quantities of seized drugs.3s0 The Chief
Judge allowed that the Department of Justice quite possibly could

develop a constitutionally permissible random urinalysis program for
all DOJ employees having "substantial responsibility for the prosecution of federal drug offenders." 0 1 However, the plan at issue in
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394).
296. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. The Justice Department's supplemental brief, citing Von Raab's mentioning of
the possibility that Customs employees who use drugs might become "unsympathetic to their
mission of interdicting narcotics," argued that "[i]t would make little sense to say that the
,national interest in self protection' vis-a-vis illegal drug trafficking applies to the Customs
agent who makes the arrest but not to the Justice Department prosecutor who handles the
matter from that point on." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393. Chief Judge Wald, however, rejected this analogy as "substantial but imperfect," primarily because federal prosecutors, unlike Customs agents, do not routinely have responsibility for confiscating, storing, or safeguarding valuable contraband. 878 F.2d at 490 & n.8.
301. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Silberman expressed strong agreement with this
comment, but explained that that was why he deplored the majority's refusal to modify the
injunction so as to authorize random testing for "all ... employees involved in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related offenses." Id. at 496 (Silberman, J., dissenting). The Von
Raab holding probably cannot be stretched far enough to permit random testing of all criminal
justice personnel, Judge Silberman opined, but it surely applies to DOJ employees who are
"responsible for drug-related criminal investigations and prosecutions." Id. at 498. Judge Silberman argued at length that under the applicable principles of judicial review, the circuit
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Harmon was not narrowly tailored so as to include only drug prosecutors, and the court was not persuaded that "an attorney who prosecutes antitrust or securities fraud cases can plausibly be analogized
to a customs agent whose job is drug interdiction."3 °2 The government's interest in ensuring employee integrity, therefore, could not
be used to justify the testing of any of the three categories of employees covered by the Justice Department plan at issue. 3 3
Chief Judge Wald next contemplated the Justice Department's

claim that the government's legitimate interest in protecting public
safety justified the random testing of DOJ employees. At first
glance, the court conceded, this contention may seem compelling;
both Von Raab and the Railway Labor Executives decision relied
heavily upon the public safety rationale to uphold the suspicionless
drug testing of certain categories of employees. 3 4 However, the Har-

mon court repudiated this argument on the ground that the public
safety concerns associated with the duties of DOJ employees are
simply not comparable with the concerns engendered by the duties of

weapons-carrying Customs agents or train engineers. 3 5 The public
safety justification adopted by the Supreme Court in Von Raab and

Railway Labor Executives "focused on the immediacy of the
threat ... the point being that a single slip-up by a gun carrying

agent or a train engineer may have irremediable consequences. "306
panel had the power and the responsibility to direct the district court to modify the injunction
insofar as it prevents the testing of what he called "drug warriors." Id. at 498-500. The majority's unwillingness to take this step, Judge Silberman declared, "strikes me as a form of judicial guerrilla warfare [intended to place] a maximum number of impediments in the way of
the Justice Department's program at minimum risk of Supreme Court review." Id. at 500.
The majority defended its disposition of the case as a textbook example of judicial restraint. Under the principles articulated in the landmark case of Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), the court was obligated "to avoid unnecessary
or premature constitutional rulings." Harmon, 878 F.2d at 494. Chief Judge Wald explained
that the majority's handling of the case was also in keeping with "the fundamental principle
that agency policy is to be made, in the first instance, by the agency itself - not by courts,
and not by agency counsel." Id. The Justice Department was free to reformulate its testing
regulations so as to target drug prosecutors, and, if these rules were challenged, the court
could then properly address their constitutionality. Id. at 495. Interestingly, the Chief Judge
expressly left open the possibility that the Justice Department might attempt to persuade the
district court that it would be appropriate to modify the injunction, even in the absence of new
drug-testing regulations. Id. at 496. The panel cautioned, however, that if the l)OJ made such
a request, "it should be prepared to explain why such a modification will neither transfer
policymaking authority from the agency to the court, nor embroil the court in an abstract or
hypothetical dispute." Id.
302. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
303. Id. at 491.
304. Id. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text, and notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
305. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491.
306. Id. In Von Raab, Justice Kennedy quoted from his Railway Labor Executives
opinion to emphasize that "Customs employees who may use deadly force plainly 'discharge
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Although a blunder by a Justice Department lawyer, if not recognized and corrected by co-workers, could conceivably pose some risk
to public safety, this is an indirect risk, "wholly different from the
risk posed by a worker who carries a gun or operates a train. 'a 7
Consequently, neither of the Supreme Court's drug-testing pronouncements could be stretched so far as to extend the public safety
rationale to the Justice Department, "where the chain of causation
between misconduct and injury is considerably more attenuated. 'a8
The third rationale for random testing advanced by the Justice
Department was the government's interest in protecting confidential
information. 0 9 This raised an especially tricky issue because in Von
Raab the Supreme Court did not actually decide the confidentiality
question at issue: whether urine testing can be imposed on Customs
Service employees seeking promotion or transfer to positions that require them "to handle classified material."3' ' The Von Raab Court
remanded this question to the Fifth Circuit for clarification as to
whether Customs employees who were listed as handling "classified
information" were actually in jobs that made them "likely to gain
access to sensitive information." ' I The Fifth Circuit panel was instructed to "examine the criteria used by the Service in determining
what materials are classified and in deciding whom to test under this
rubric," and it was told to consider "pertinent information bearing
upon the employees' privacy expectations" in reaching its decision. 1 2
Although the Von Raab majority did not issue a decision on the
merits of this part of the Customs Service testing program, Chief
Judge Wald's Harmon opinion relied heavily upon the following
quote from Justice Kennedy's Von Raab opinion: "We readily agree
that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly
sensitive information. . . .We also agree that employees who seek
promotions to positions where they would handle sensitive information can be required to submit to a urine test under the Service's
screening program."31 3 These statements arguably constitute
duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can
have disastrous consequences." Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491 (quoting Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1393 (quoting Railway Labor Executives, 109 S. Ct. at 1419)).
307. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 491.
310. See supra note 128; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct.
1384, 1396-97 (1989).
311. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397.
312. Id.
313. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. at 1396-97). The principal case cited by the Von Raab Court to support the pro-
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dicta.""4 It was not unreasonable, however, for the Harmon court to
rely on Justice Kennedy's statements for guidance in judging the legitimacy of the comparable portion of the Justice Department's testing plan. Since that part of the plan singled out only DOJ employees
who have access to top secret materials of the highest order of confidentiality, 315 the court held it to be permissible, commenting that

"[w]hatever 'truly sensitive' information includes, we agree that it
encompasses top secret national security information." ' 6 The Chief
Judge acknowledged that the Justice Department's testing plan, because of its random nature, was "somewhat more intrusive" than the
position that the government has a compelling interest in protecting "truly sensitive information" was Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (upholding the Navy's authority to deny a security clearance to a government employee seeking a job at a nuclear
submarine repair facility).
314. Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab noted that "[tihe Court apparently approves
application of the urine tests to personnel receiving access to 'sensitive information,' . . . but is
unsure whether 'classified material' is 'sensitive information.' " 109 S. Ct. at 1401 n.1 (Scalia,
J. dissenting) (emphasis added). It should also be noted that in quoting from Justice Kennedy's Von Raab opinion, Chief Judge Wald left out a potentially important part of the statement that apparently approves of urinalysis for those with access to sensitive information. The
complete sentence is:
We also agree that employees who seek promotions to positions where they
would handle sensitive information can be required to submit to a urine test
under the Service's screening program, especially if the positions covered under
this category requirebackground investigations, medical examinations, or other
intrusions that may be expected to diminish their expectations of privacy in
respect of a urinalysis test.
Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397 (emphasis added). Moreover, in his remand instructions to the
Fifth Circuit, Justice Kennedy stressed that , "[i]n assessing the reasonableness of requiring
tests of [Customs employees with access to sensitive information], the court should also consider pertinent information bearing upon the employees' privacy expectations, as well as the
supervision to which these employees are already subject." Id.
The Harmon court made no reference to any such information regarding the privacy expectations of Justice Department employees who have access to sensitive information. This is
surprising because Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Von Raab made it clear that the
decision to employ a reasonableness test does not, in and of itself, obviate a court's responsibility to assess the interference with individual privacy engendered by urinalysis: "[W]here a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390
(citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413-14 (1989)). And,
indeed, in his Von Raab opinion, Justice Kennedy stressed: "[Algainst [the] valid public interests we must weigh the interference with individual liberty that results from requiring [particular] classes of employees to undergo a urine test." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393.
315. The relevant portion of the Justice Department plan specified that testing would be
performed on "[aIll incumbents currently authorized to have access to top secret classified
information in accordance with Executive Order 12356." Harmon, 878 F.2d at 486 (citing
OBD Plan at 6). Under Executive Order 12356, national security information is to be classified at one of three levels: top secret, secret, or confidential. The top secret designation applies
only to "information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to
cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." Id. at 491-92 n.l 1 (quoting 47
Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 6, 1982)).
316. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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plan upheld in Von Raab,a17 but concluded that, "[i] f submission to
drug testing can legitimately be made a requirement for access to
top secret materials-and Von Raab indicates as much-then the
government may properly make testing a requirement for holding a

top secret security clearance." 318
This was as far as the Harmon tribunal was willing to go, however. The government's interest in protecting secret information,
Chief Judge Wald explained, cannot justify the mandatory testing of
all federal prosecutors or of all the employees who have access to
grand jury proceedings."s

9

Although the Von Raab opinion certainly

did not outline the precise contours of truly sensitive information, it
was unlikely, reasoned the Chief Judge, that the term can "include
all information which is confidential or closed to public view." ' After all, federal prosecutors and workers with access to grand jury
proceedings are among a very large number of federal employees,
including clerks, typists, and messengers, who are sometimes privy to
confidential information falling below the top secret level.3 2 Therefore, it makes little sense to distinguish these two categories of employees from federal employees generally for purposes of drug testing. 311 Since the Von Raab Court seemed to be principally concerned

with protecting information of the highest order of confidentiality,32

the confidentiality rationale cited in Von Raab cannot be stretched

to justify the testing of all DOJ employees within the first two job
categories at issue. 324 Accordingly, the Harmon court affirmed the
portion of the district court's injunction that enjoined random testing
of federal prosecutors and workers with access to grand jury proceedings, but instructed the court to modify the injunction so as to
permit the testing of all Justice Department employees who hold top
secret national security clearances.32
317. Id. at 492.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
322. Id. It can also be argued that the government cannot reasonably claim that it is
advancing its interest in preserving secrecy by testing only two of the many categories of employees with access to confidential information.
323. Id. Chief Judge Wald pointed out that the Von Raab Court expressed concern that
the Customs Service may have defined the category of employees with access to sensitive information "more broadly than necessary to meet the purposes of the Commissioner's directive."
Harmon, 878 F.2d at 492 (citing Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397).
324. Id. at 492-93.
325. Id. at 493. This means, of course, that federal prosecutors and employees who have
access to grand jury proceedings are among the DOJ employees who can be subjected to random testing if they hold top secret security clearances. It also means that a DOJ employee
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The Harmon court did an admirable job of analyzing the Von
Raab opinion and of using the relevant portions of the holding to
assess the constitutionality of the random drug-testing plan developed by the Justice Department. However, Harmon also demonstrates just how difficult it will be for lower courts to apply the Railway Labor Executives and Von Raab decisions to the facts of
various drug-testing controversies. In fact, early in her Harmon
opinion, Chief Judge Wald lamented the Von Raab majority's failure "to articulate an analytical rule by which legitimate drug-testing
programs could be distinguished from illegitimate ones. "326
The Chief Judge's complaint is well taken. As previously noted,
neither Supreme Court decision makes it clear whether all publicemployee drug-testing plans fall in the special needs category and
thus must be analyzed via a reasonableness test.32 7 Moreover, the
reasonableness tests employed in Railway Labor Executives and Von
Raab simply enumerated a number of factors deemed to be relevant
to the process of balancing the government's policy objectives against
the privacy expectations of employees.32 8 The majority Justices made
no effort to assess the relative importance of the various factors that
are weighed against one another in a reasonableness balancing test.
Most importantly, the testing schemes evaluated in Railway Labor
Executives and Von Raab did not involve the unannounced uniform
or random testing of incumbent employees who had not been involved in an accident or who had not triggered their own drug test
by deciding to seek transfer or promotion to a covered position. To
illustrate the complexities inherent in evaluating the permissibility of
these more intrusive types of programs, following is an examination
of the most important pre-Von Raab decisions on the constitutionality of uniform and random drug testing.
2. Major Pre-Von Raab Decisions.-Some of the most important drug-testing cases decided before the Von Raab and Railway
Labor Executives holdings involved challenges to drug-testing
schemes that included both uniform and random components. For
example, in Shoemaker v. Handel,3 29 a Third Circuit panel considcannot be compelled to undergo urinalysis simply because he or she holds a secret or confidential security clearance.
326. Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Chief Judge Wald
commented that as a result of the questions left unanswered by Von Raab, "[aipplication of
Von Raab to the facts of the present case presents a delicate task." Id.
327. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
329. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
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ered the constitutionality of New Jersey Racing Commission regulations requiring all jockeys to take a breathalyzer test every day they
were engaged to race and to undergo urinalysis on a random basis.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that neither
type of testing violated the jockeys' fourth amendment rights.33 The
appellate tribunal relied heavily on the fact that horse racing is a
highly regulated industry, licensed by the state, and that in such industries, the courts have carved out an administrative search exception to the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements of the
fourth amendment. 31 The court conceded that the administrative
search exception generally applies only to searches of premises pursuant to an administrative inspection scheme, but it reasoned that
the administrative search exception could be extended to persons engaged in a regulated industry if (1) "there [is] a strong state interest
in conducting [the] search," and (2) "the pervasive regulation of the
industry [has] reduced the justifiable privacy expectations of the
subject of the search. 8 32
Both of these requirements were found to be present; the court
was satisfied that New Jersey has a strong interest in assuring the
public of the integrity of racing employees and that the horse racing
industry historically has been so extensively regulated that everyone
who has chosen to become involved in it should have been aware that
the Racing Commission would take appropriate measures, including
searches, to assure public confidence in the integrity of the sport.3 33
Moreover, the court saw no significant legal differences between the
daily breathalyzer testing and the random urine testing.334 The
breathalyzer tests were given to every jockey on a daily basis and the
urine tests were administered on the basis of a truly random lottery
system. 8 ' Therefore, neither testing program allowed racing officials
room for the kind of standardless, and thus potentially arbitrary and
discriminatory, exercise of discretion condemned by the Supreme
Court in other contexts.3 6
330. Id. at 1136.
331. Id. at 1142.
332. Id.
333. Id. Surprisingly, the appeals court did not rely upon the argument that horse racing
is a highly dangerous sport that requires a jockey to be in full possession of his or her mental
and physical capabilities. The district court emphasized the importance of ensuring that horse
races are safely run. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1102-03 (D.N.J. 1985),
aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
334. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986
(1986).
335. Id.
336. Id. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that police may not
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The argument that uniform and random drug testing of employees working in a closely regulated industry is justifiable as an administrative search was embraced by an Eighth Circuit panel in 1988. In
Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,"" the court considered
the constitutionality of a program requiring urine testing on both an
annual and a random basis for all of the employees of a nuclear
power plant who had access to protected areas of the plant. Two
engineers, contending the testing violated their constitutional rights,
refused to comply and were fired.3 8 8 In a very brief opinion, the
court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the testing
scheme was lawful. The appeals court acknowledged that "some potentially embarrassing personal information can be obtained via
urinalysis,"3'39 but asserted that the great potential for harm that
could be caused by a nuclear power plant accident distinguished this
case from other cases in which drug-testing programs had been held
to be unconstitutional.3 4 Most importantly, the court stressed that
the employees' expectations of privacy had already been significantly
diminished by virtue of working in an industry that is exceptionally
heavily regulated. 34 Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he facts of
this case place it squarely within the administrative search exception
3 42
articulated in Shoemaker v. Handel.
Two 1988 rulings by Third Circuit panels sanctioned the random testing of public employees, but one decision was based on the
administrative search exception and the other relied upon a twopronged reasonableness test much like the one used by the Supreme
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.343 and O'Connor v. Ortega.4" In Policeman's Benevolent Association of New Jersey, Local 318 v.
Washington Township,345 Chief Judge Gibbons, writing for a unanimous panel, cited at great length the various city and state statutes
and regulations that govern the Washington Township Police Department and the conduct of individual officers. 4 These statutes and
pull over a motorist for a spot check unless they have some articulable and reasonable basis for
doing so, but suggesting that roadblock-type stops or other methods for spot checks that sufficiently circumscribe the exercise of discretion may be permissible).
337. 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
338. Id. at 563.
339. Id. at 566.
340. Id. at 567.
341. Id. at 566. The court also noted that the testing program "does not require that
someone witness the employee urinate." Id.
342. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988).
343. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
344. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
345. 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
346. Id. at 137-41.
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regulations "speak for themselves," he contended, in demonstrating
that the officers were part of a quasi-military organization and were
subject to extensive personal regulations including a regulation mandating off-duty carrying of a firearm, a rule requiring constant readiness for duty, and rules of conduct covering their personal lives.34 7
Thus, the court concluded, there could be little doubt that random
urinalysis could be justified as an administrative search: "When
compared with the history of regulation held in Shoemaker to be
the
sufficient for application of the administrative search exception,
348
occupation of police officer is far more intensely regulated.
On the other hand, in Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pennsylvania TransportationAuthority,349 a different Third Circuit panel held that the random testing of transportation workers in safety-sensitive jobs (including
operators, signalmen, and maintenance workers for subways, railroads, trolleys, streetcars, and buses) could not be sustained under
the administrative search doctrine. Writing for a unanimous panel,
Judge Sloviter acknowledged that the state legislation covering
SEPTA is extensive enough to establish that public transportation is
indeed a highly regulated industry.350 But these statutes, unlike the
statutes and regulations scrutinized by the Washington Township
court, did not implicate the private lives of public transportation
workers.3 51 Hence, the state's regulation of the transportation industry, in and of itself, did not "effect a comparable diminution of employees' expectations of personal privacy," and the random-testing
program could not be upheld as an administrative search.3 52
Having rejected the applicability of an administrative search
analysis, the appeals tribunal proceeded to consider SEPTA's random-testing scheme under the familiar two-part reasonableness
test.3 53 Judge Sloviter explained that in cases such as this, requiring
a careful balancing of the individual's privacy expectations against
347. Id. at 141.
348. Id. Bookspan, supra note 66 at 395, expressed concern that expanding the administrative search doctrine to cover public-employee drug testing will "take a huge bite out of the
fourth amendment and pave the way for the administrative search exception to swallow up the
fourth amendment altogether." Cf. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1981) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (arguing that further expansion of the administrative search doctrine would
allow Congress to "define any industry as dangerous, regulate it substantially, and provide for
warrantless inspections of its members").
349. 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989).
350. Id. at 1117.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1117-18.
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the government's interests, "[c]ourts must look, first, to whether the
search was 'justified at its inception' and, second, to whether the
search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' "8,4
As the court viewed it, the SEPTA testing plan satisfied both
prongs of the test. Judge Sloviter conceded that random drug testing
intrudes on personal privacy in a "more than minimal" way, but declared that the testing was justified at its inception because of the
government's compelling interest in protecting the safety of "large
groups of persons traveling by mass transit."3 55 The court cited
SEPTA studies showing that 82 of 262 employees tested "for cause"
between January 1985 and July 1987 tested positive for illegal drugs
or alcohol and that at least six major accidents involving 89 injured
people in 1986 and 1987 were caused by drug-impaired vehicle operators." 6 The second part of the reasonableness standard was also
satisfied, according to the appellate panel, because the random-testing program was limited in scope to employees whose job performance was closely connected to public safety. a1 In addition, the court
expressed its confidence that the testing plan contained "sufficient
safeguards, in the form of confidentiality, chain of custody, verification, and random selection procedures, to protect against abuse of
discretion by implementing officials."3' '
A controversial drug-testing program in Iowa that included both
random and uniform testing was approved by an Eighth Circuit
panel in 1987, but the court failed to clarify the rationale for its
decision. In McDonell v. Hunter,a5 9 the court modified a district
court holding that had enjoined the random and uniform testing of
prison guards and other correctional institution employees. The circuit court alluded to the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement, 3e0 but did not clearly rest its holding on the administrative search rule or, for that matter, on any other
recognizable judicial standard of analysis.
354. Transport Workers' Union of Philadelphia, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1118 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989)
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
20 (1968))). This two-part test also was endorsed as appropriate in compulsory urinalysis cases
by a District of Columbia Circuit panel. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger,
818 F.2d 935, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
355. Transport Workers' Union, 863 F.2d at 1119.
356. Id. at 1119-20.
357. Id. at 1121.
358. Id.
359. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
360. Id. at 1308.
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Although the court did not cite a single specific example of a
prison problem or incident that could be attributed to employee drug
use, it nevertheless accepted prison officials' contentions that the onduty or off-duty use of drugs by an employee could be an indication
that he or she might bring drugs into the prison and that employees
who work with prisoners "must be alert at all times."' The court
also expressed the debatable view that "[u]rinalysis properly administered is not as intrusive as . . . a blood test," and concluded that
random and uniform testing of all employees who have day-to-day
contact with prisoners in medium or maximum security prisons is
"[t]he only way [employee drug use] can be controlled in a satisfac-

tory manner .

,32

"...

3 63 a Sixth CirBy contrast, in Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,
cuit panel refused to permit mandatory urine testing of all city fire
fighters in the absence of any evidence of a significant departmentwide drug problem. In 1985, the City of Chattanooga instituted a
uniform testing program in which every member of the fire department was ordered to report for urinalysis while on duty.3" ' As the
Lovvorn court noted, the tests were not conducted pursuant to any
written guidelines or standards. 65 As a result of the 1985 tests, ten
employees were terminated, five resigned, and seventeen were placed
on probation.3 66 When the city announced plans to resume testing in
the summer of 1986, three fire fighters filed suit against the city, and
the district court enjoined further testing as violative of the fourth
amendment. 6 7
By a two-to-one vote, 36 8 the court of appeals affirmed the dis-

361. Id. at 1307-08. In dissent, Chief Judge Lay asserted that the majority's approval of
uniform and random testing was "improper and unsupportable" because it was "based not on
facts in the record but on de novo findings at the appellate level." Id. at 1311-12 (Lay, C.J.,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
362. 809 F.2d at 1308.
363. 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting rehearing en banc).
364. See id. at 1540-41.
365. Id. at 1541.

366. Id.
367. Id. at 1540-41.
368. In addition to Judge Martin's majority opinion, there was a concurring opinion and
a dissenting opinion. Judge Johnstone's concurring opinion emphasized the "seriously intrusive" nature of urinalysis and contended that the "potential, general social damage" that
might be visited upon society by drug-using employees should not be considered by a court in
evaluating the lawfulness of urine testing. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539,
1549-51 (6th Cir.) (Johnstone, J., concurring), vacated, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting rehearing en banc). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Guy questioned whether urinalysis
amounted to a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment and argued that even if it
did, the majority's analysis failed to give sufficient weight to the city's concerns about the
potential consequences of employee drug use. Id. at 1551-63 (Guy, J., dissenting).
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trict court's decision. The Lovvorn majority employed the T.L.O.
two-pronged reasonableness test369 and found the city's testing
scheme to be constitutionally flawed because it failed the first part of
the test: it was not justified at its inception. 370 The city's justifications for establishing the testing program were not strong enough, in
the court's analysis, to balance the fire fighters' considerable expectations of privacy both in terms of the act of urination itself and the
information contained in the urine. 71
Citing the Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District decision, 72 Judge Martin's majority opinion allowed that mandatory
testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion would be constitutionally palatable if drug-impaired employees were "in a position to impose significant irretrievable losses on society. 3 3 He contended,
however, that the likelihood of such losses occurring because of an
impaired fire fighter, though not inconsequential, "is significantly
lower than with impaired air traffic controllers and nuclear plant employees who literally hold thousands of lives in their hands everyday. ' 374 This difference in the potential harm to society becomes
even more significant in light of the failure of city officials to produce any evidence of a widespread drug problem among the city's
fire fighters.37 5 Accordingly, the majority concluded that "[t]he low
probability of a given test being positive, in combination with the
moderate benefits to society of a positive test result, do not justify a
restriction of the constitutional rights of the City of Chattanooga's
fire fighters. 376
A federal district court in Illinois struck down a uniform drugtesting program on slightly different grounds in a noteworthy 1987
369. Id. at 1543-44. It is also interesting to note that the court flatly rejected the argument that mandatory drug testing could be justified as an administrative search solely because
a given employment industry is heavily regulated. Such an approach, opined the court, "is
simplistic and intellectually indefensible." Id. at 1545.
370. Id. at 1548.
371. Id. at 1546-48.
372. Id. at 1547. See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text.
373. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1549 (6th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d
1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting rehearing en banc).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. On the same day the Lovvorn decision was announced, the same Sixth Circuit
panel, for the reasons cited in Lovvorn, held unconstitutional the City of Chattanooga's plan to
impose urine testing on all members of its police department. Once again the vote was two-toone. See Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir.), vacated, 862 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1988)
(granting rehearing en banc). For a strong criticism of police drug-testing programs, see Dunham, Lewis & Alpert, Testing the Police for Drugs, 24 CRlM. L. BULL. 155 (1988) (contending that urine testing is expensive and divisive, and cannot take the place of effective
supervision).
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case. In Taylor v. O'Grady,87 correctional officers challenged a
Cook County Department of Corrections program requiring all employees to submit annually to an unannounced urinalysis. Upon being notified at roll call that it was their day to provide a urine sample, employees were taken to a bathroom, subjected to a pat-down
search, and told to urinate in a cup while another employee observed
them from a "discreet" distance. 78 After a four-day trial on the
merits, the court enjoined enforcement of the testing program, not
on the ground that it failed the first part of the two-pronged reasonableness test, but on the ground that it failed the second step. 379
Based upon the trial testimony, Judge Getzendanner found that
although the testing procedure clearly infringed the employees' reasonable expectations of the privacy "in the act, place and decision of
urination, ' 88° it nevertheless was justified at its inception because

there was substantial evidence that the program "will successfully
turn up evidence of work-related drug use."1 However, the trial

testimony was equally convincing, explained Judge Getzendanner, in
demonstrating that the urinalysis program was not "reasonably related [in scope] to the objectives of the search."3 81 This was because
uncontradicted testimony at trial had established that trained supervision (i.e. supervisory awareness of tardiness, increased absences,
decreased ability to perform tasks, changed relationships with coworkers) can be nearly equally effective in detecting the chronic

abusers of drugs and those who are impaired at work. 8" A supervisor's observance of behavior indicative of drug abuse, Judge
377. 669 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. 11. 1987), vacated, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
378. Id. at 1424-25.
379. Id. at 1438.
380. Id. at 1434. The court was especially influenced by the testimony of a female corrections sergeant:
[Wihen McNeal was compelled to urinate in the washroom stall, she was instructed to keep the stall door open. McNeal then had to hold the stall door open
and hold her pants off the floor with her one hand while she attempted to urinate
into a cup held in her other hand. To effectively urinate into the cup, she had to
do all this while standing. While urinating, McNeal was directly and constantly
observed by the officer administering the test.
Id. at 1433.
381. Id. at 1438. The testimony led the court to estimate that about 50 of the 1700
employees abuse nonalcoholic drugs. Id. at 1437.
382. Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1438 (N.D. Ill. 1987), vacated, 888 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
383. Id. Judge Getzendanner also took judicial notice of neurobehavioral testing, including memory, visual retention, and block design tests, as an effective way to identify drug users
in a less intrusive manner than urinalysis. But the court concluded that it was doubtful that
such testing could be administered to all employees in the Department of Corrections in a
single year because each test takes at least one hour to administer and then must be evaluated
by an expert. Id. at 1433.
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Getzendanner pointed out, "might well establish the sort of reasonable cause that justifies the invasive technique of urinalysis." 384 Since
trained supervision, a much less offensive method of discovering drug
users, can successfully promote the government's interests in
preventing the smuggling of drugs into the prison and in ensuring an
unimpaired work force, the urinalysis program cannot be deemed to
be reasonably related to the government's goals.3 85 In the court's
words, "the availability of trained supervision as an equally successful but completely unintrusive means of identifying drug abusers
renders urinalysis unconstitutional. 3 6
Several state courts also have enjoined random or uniform drugtesting schemes as violative of constitutional standards.3 87 The most
significant state decision to date is Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Education,8 8 in which the New York Court of
Appeals held that a policy requiring all probationary teachers to submit to urinalysis constituted an illegal search under both the New
York Constitution and the United States Constitution. By making it
clear that their judgment was grounded in the search and seizure
clause of the state constitution 8 9 as well as the search and seizure
clause of the fourth amendment, the Justices of New York's highest
court effectively removed their decision from possible reversal by the
U.S. Supreme Court. It is now well established law that the Supreme Court will not review a state law decision that clearly and
expressly is based on adequate and independent state grounds so
384. Id. at 1438.
385. Id. The court acknowledged that urinalysis would be superior to trained supervision
in furthering a third government interest--ensuring the integrity of the work force by detecting employees who abuse drugs off-duty as well as on-duty. Id. at 1439. Urinalysis for
purposes of maintaining integrity, however, is not a search that is justified at its inception
because no evidence presented at the trial showed that there was a public perception of a drug
problem among correctional employees and because there was no evidence "suggesting some
tangible consequence to an integrity problem, were one actually perceived." Id.
386. Id. at 1438. As this Article was going to press, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding district court's injunction against testing of correctional employees having no regular access to inmate population but instructing district court to modify
injunction so as to permit annual urine testing of employees who come into regular contact
with inmates, who have opportunities to smuggle drugs to inmates, or who carry firearms).
387. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 524
A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1987) (enjoining twice-a-year testing of all members of police
narcotics unit on the ground that such testing violates the state constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (enjoining random urinalysis of police officers and fire fighters as
violative of the search and seizure clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and the Florida Constitution, and holding that testing may be required only on the basis of reasonable suspicion
that a particular officer or fire fighter is using drugs on or off the job).
388. 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987).
389. Id. at 66, 510 N.E.2d at 328-29, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
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long as the decision expands, rather than undermines, federally guaranteed individual rights. 39
In holding that the school district's plan to compel all of its nontenured teachers to undergo urinalysis constituted an unreasonable

search, the New York tribunal placed great emphasis on the failure
of school authorities to offer any evidence that drug abuse is a problem among teachers generally or among the teachers in the particular school district. 9' Writing for a unanimous court, 92 Chief Judge
Wachtler pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in New
Jersey v. T.L.O. 98 requires school officials to be able to articulate
facts amounting to reasonable suspicion before they can search stu-

dents.3 94 Thus, despite considerable evidence that drug use is a major

problem among students, school officials have not been granted the

power to subject students to suspicionless searches.39
In the instant case, school officials conceded that they had no
basis for believing that teacher drug use was a problem and that

they did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that any probation390. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("If the state court decision
indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate,
and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision"); Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (although a state court may not interpret the federal Constitution in a more expansive manner than the Supreme Court has permitted, it nevertheless "is
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary under federal constitutional standards"); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (the Supreme Court "will not review judgments of state courts that rest
on adequate and independent state grounds").
There is a growing literature on the willingness of some state courts of last resort to
develop a body of state law-based rights that are co-extensive with or broader than those the
Supreme Court finds to exist under the federal Constitution. See generally Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a
Crocodile in the Bathtub, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19 (1989); Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 535 (1986); Haas, The "New Federalism" and Prisoners Rights: State Supreme Courts
in Comparative Perspective, 34 W. POL. Q. 552 (1981). But see Maltz, False
Prophet-JusticeBrennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 429 (1988); Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, 63 DEN. UL. REv. 85 (1985).
391. Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 69-70, 510 N.E.2d 325,
330-31, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 462 (1987).
392. Although the decision was unanimous, Judge Simons wrote a concurring opinion
expressing agreement with the court's conclusion that the random-testing plan violated the
fourth amendment but arguing that the court's reliance on the state constitution was premature, unnecessary, and unwarranted. See id. at 71-75, 510 N.E.2d at 331-34, 517 N.Y.S.2d at
463-65 (Simons, J., concurring).
393. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
394. Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 68, 510 N.E.2d 325,
330, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 461 (1987) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8
(1985)).
395. Id. at 68, 510 N.E.2d at 330, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
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ary teachers were engaged in drug abuse.396 Chief Judge Wachtler
did not question the assertion that the government has a legitimate
interest in making sure that its employees do not use illegal drugs
and that this goal "would be more attainable if the state were able to

search everyone periodically in an all-inclusive dragnet.''397 He declared, however, that the inclusion of provisions restricting the government to reasonable searches in both the state and federal constitutions demonstrated beyond any doubt the recognition that "there
comes a point at which searches intended to serve the public interest,
however effective, may themselves undermine the public's interest in
maintaining the privacy, dignity and security of its members."' 98
Uniform or random searches conducted without reasonable suspicion
might be constitutionally permissible, the Chief Judge conceded,
when the individual's expectations of privacy are minimal, the government's interests are substantial, and safeguards are provided to
protect against abuse of discretion by the authorities. 39 9 But, in this
case, the court concluded, "those requirements have not been
40 0
satisfied."
V.

Conclusion

In its 1988-89 term, the U.S. Supreme Court settled several significant questions concerning the constitutionality of government-employee drug-testing programs. The Court's decision in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association40 1 resolved any lingering
doubts that public-employee urinalysis is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment and approved suspicionless urine and
blood testing of all crew members of trains involved in serious accidents. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,40 2 the
396. Id. at 69, 510 N.E.2d at 330-31, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
397. Id. at 70, 510 N.E.2d at 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
398. Id. at 70, 510 N.E.2d at 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
399. Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 70, 510 N.E.2d 325,
331, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 462 (1987) (citing People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984)).
400. Id. at 70, 510 N.E.2d at 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 462. Applying the criteria elaborated in Patchoque,the New York Court of Appeals subsequently upheld a program requiring
random urine testing of every member of a special corps of New York City police officers,
90% of whom were involved in hazardous narcotics-related operations. Caruso v. Ward, 72
N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988). The court stressed that the government's substantial interest in preventing drug use by members of an elite drug-enforcement
unit and the minimal expectations of privacy among members of the unit distinguished the
urinalysis program as one that "falls within the narrow exception tn Matter of PatchoqueMedford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ.
72 N.Y.2d 432, 442, 530 N.E.2d
850, 855, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142, 147 (1988).
401. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
402. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
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Court upheld the United States Customs Service's suspicionless
drug-testing program for all employees seeking promotion or transfer
to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring the
carrying of firearms.
Although these decisions must be considered major setbacks for
public-employee unions and others opposed to drug testing, neither
holding can be read as giving government employers carte blanche
authority to force all employees to undergo urinalysis or other types
of drug testing. The Railway Labor Executives holding approved
only the post-accident testing of employees who work in safety-sensitive jobs in an industry that has long been pervasively regulated to
protect public safety. The Von Raab decision arguably applies only
to the pre-promotion or pre-transfer testing of employees who make
their own decision to seek a high-risk, safety-sensitive position,
knowing full well that one of the requirements for the position is a
urine test that will be administered on a pre-arranged date by a laboratory technician who will allow them to urinate in the privacy of a
bathroom stall. These holdings do not necessarily apply to drug-testing programs aimed at employees who do not perform such safetysensitive tasks or to programs that are more destructive of the privacy of the covered employees. It is extremely doubtful, for example,
that Von Raab could be stretched so far as to legitimize the random
urine testing of public school teachers.
Nevertheless, a likely result of the two holdings is an increased
commitment to drug testing by both public and private employers.
As noted previously, the fourth amendment is not binding on private
companies unless state action is found.4 3 But many constitutionally
unencumbered private employers may have been hesitant to implement drug testing, with the attendant risks of employee resentment
and union opposition, in the absence of a signal from the Supreme
Court that such programs are permissible in the public-employment
sphere. Thus, as Justice Scalia speculated in his Von Raab dissent,
the symbolic effect of the decisions may turn out to be significant for
both public and private labor unions.404 Though limited in scope, the
Railway Labor Executives and Von Raab holdings can only
strengthen the position of management vis-a-vis that of labor with
respect to drug-testing controversies. At this point, employee unions
and their attorneys would be well advised to look closely at state
constitutions and the recent decisional tendencies of the state courts
403.
404.

See supra notes 10-i1 and accompanying text.
109 S. Ct. 1384, 2480 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in right-of-privacy cases, search and seizure cases, and in other areas
of law that are applicable to questions of the permissibility of various
drug-testing schemes.
The Railway Labor Executives and Von Raab decisions are undoubtedly important for what they tell us about the Supreme Court's
evolving-and narrowing-view of the fourth amendment. But the
cases may be even more important for what they do not tell us about
the future of drug testing. Justice Kennedy's majority opinions do
little to clarify the contours of the constitutional public-employee
drug-testing program. The Court's use of a broad and malleable
"multifactor balancing" or "reasonableness under all the circumstances" analysis rather than a more traditional warrant and probable cause analysis or the two-part reasonableness test employed in
past special needs cases will inevitably create extremely difficult linedrawing problems that will lead to numerous conflicts among the
lower federal and state courts. Ironically, the High Court's unwillingness to articulate any bright lines or clear analytical principles
and its insistence on a case-by-case balancing of governmental and
individual interests will probably result in a substantial increase in
drug-testing litigation for at least several years. Unless and until the
Court develops more precise standards for distinguishing legitimate
drug-testing plans from illegitimate ones, confusion, conflict, instability, and unpredictability will reign in this area of law.
For now, it seems safe only to predict that most drug-testing
cases will be decided on the basis of a reasonableness analysis focusing on all the facts and circumstances that a particular court deems
relevant. Among the factors likely to be considered are (1) the
strength of the government's interests in testing; (2) whether the employees are in jobs that put them in a position to endanger themselves or others; (3) the strength of the employees' privacy expectations; and (4) the intrusiveness of the testing procedures. Some
courts may take the position that the Supreme Court's decisions do
not rule out the consideration of such factors as (1) whether there is
any evidence of a drug problem among the covered employees 0 5 and
(2) the availability of less intrusive methods of detecting drug use
405. In his majority opinion in the Railway Labor Executives case, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that there was considerable evidence of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees. Railway Labor Executives, 109 S. Ct. at 1407-08. Moreover, although the Von Raab
majority opinion rejected the argument that the dearth of evidence of a significant drug problem among Customs Service employees impugned the validity of the Customs testing program,
the Court never stated that the absence of evidence of drug use among employees is irrelevant
in all drug testing cases. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394-95.
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(i.e., better trained supervisors or neurobehavioral testing). 06
Under our legal system, major Supreme Court pronouncements
often raise more question than they settle, especially in new and
complex areas of law. The Court simply cannot hear enough cases to
clarify all of the corollary principles that may or may not derive
from its decisions. But the majority opinions in the Railway Labor
Executives and Von Raab cases are needlessly ambiguous and leave
open numerous issues and questions pertaining to public-employee
drug testing while providing little guidance in resolving them. Some
of these issues have engendered little or no conflict among the lower
federal and state courts. There is virtually unanimous agreement, for
example, that government agencies can require all current and prospective employees to undergo urinalysis as part of a routine, periodic physical examination, but that a government employer cannot
single out a particular employee and compel him or her to submit to
urinalysis solely on the basis of an inarticulate hunch that the employee is abusing drugs. The most important unresolved questions-and the ones that have prompted the greatest disharmony
among the lower courts-are those involving the constitutionality of
uniform and/or random drug-testing programs. Given the constitutional importance of the questions surrounding such programs and
the varying standards of review promulgated by the lower courts, it
is hoped that the Justices will seek to clarify the permissible limits of
uniform and random testing programs in the near future.4 7
Certainly the most ominous sign for those who are opposed to
drug testing is that the Von Raab majority upheld the Customs Service's authority to test promotion-seeking employees even though
there was no evidence that drug abuse was a major, or even appreciable, problem among Customs employees. Moreover, while these employees were seeking jobs that are arguably safety sensitive, they
were not seeking jobs which, to use the Sixth Circuit's language in
406. Railway Labor Executives noted that the Federal Railroad Administration had
"expressly considered [less intrusive] alternatives to its drug-screening program and reasonably
found them wanting." Railway Labor Executives, 109 S. Ct. at 1419 n.9. Consequently, the
majority declined "to second-guess the reasonable conclusions drawn by the FRA after years
of investigation and study." Id. This leaves open the possibility that judicial consideration of
the availability of less intrusive methods of detecting drug use may be appropriate in cases in
which a government agency fails to show that it has examined the potential effectiveness of
alternative methods of uncovering employee drug use. Moreover, even though Justice Kennedy
commented that "[tihe reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means," id. (quoting Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)), he did not state that the use of a "less intrusive
means" analysis would be inappropriate in all drug-testing cases.
407. As this Article was going to press, the Court had not yet granted certiorari in a
case involving the constitutionality of a uniform or random drug-testing program.
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Lovvorn, would put them "in a position to impose significant irretrievable losses on society. ' 4 0 8 It is especially difficult to predict the
constitutional future of public-employee drug testing because it is
not known whether any of the five Justices in the Von Raab majority
regarded the Customs Service program as being on or near the line
separating permissible from impermissible drug-testing programs. If
the logic of Von Raab continues to prevail, however, the Court can
be expected to bestow its constitutional stamp of approval on a wide
variety of drug-testing programs covering a wide range of public
employees.

408. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1547 (6th Cir.), vacated, 861 F.2d
1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting rehearing en banc).

